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Diener: Judicial Approval of FLSA Back Wages Settlement Agreements

JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF FLSA BACK WAGES SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS

*KeithWilliam Diener
This articleprovides a new framework for supervising FairLabor
Standards Act ("FLSA ") settlement agreements for back wages. It
explains the historical context that led to the .development of a
requirement that FLSA settlement agreements for back wages be
supervised, and critiques the various district court methods of
supervising these agreements. This article outlines the contours of the
contemporary split in the circuit courts regarding supervisory
requirements, and then concludes with a new approach that may be
utilized to supervise FLSA settlement agreementsfor back wages. This
approach contends that the language of 'fairness" and
"reasonableness" be abandoned and instead that FLSA settlement
agreements for back wages should be examined by using traditional
public policy considerations. This articleproposes that supervision is
necessary and that FLSA settlement agreements for back wages should
be subject to a rebuttable presumption of enforceability when certain
policy-derivedprerequisites are satisfied.
INTRODUCTION

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 19381 was passed to remedy the
poor working conditions that mired the Great Depression, including the
deleterious effects of the industrial age, consequent low wages, and
proliferating child labor.: The FLSA's justificatory policies include
reducing the poor working conditions that burden commerce, create
unfair competition, result in labor disputes, and interfere with the orderly
* Assistant Professor, Stockton University. The author gratefully acknowledges the feedback from
the participants of the Invited Scholars Colloquium hosted at the 92nd annual conference of the
Academy of Legal Studies in Business held in Savannah, Georgia. The author further wishes to
gratefully acknowledge the comments offered by Charlotte Alexander, Associate Professor at
Georgia State University, on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
2. See Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, DisappearingRights: ConfidentialSettlements and
the FairLabor Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109, 113 (2013).
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marketing of goods in commerce.3 These overarching policies of the
FLSA were intended to combat "labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers....,4 The FLSA's
provisions intended to provide for a living wage, motivate employers to
hire more employees, and disperse the work among a broader population
of workers.5 Among the mechanisms for effectuating its purposes, the
FLSA provides minimum wage6 and overtime requirements. When
back wages are sought for violations of minimum wage or overtime
requirements, injured employees may file a complaint in state or federal
court, or with the Secretary of Labor. 8 Once that complaint is filed in
court, however, injured employees enter into a system of considerable
uncertainty that is incited by contradictory district and circuit court
opinions and inconsistent methods of reviewing FLSA back wages
settlement agreements.
This Article contends that judicial supervision of FLSA settlement
agreements for back wages should be relaxed. Rather, courts should
instead adopt a rebuttable presumption that settlement agreements
resolving disputes over whether back wages are owed to FLSA covered
employees, which satisfy certain criteria, do comport with public policy.
A new framework is needed for addressing what has become an
inconsistent, nuanced, and overall murky area of wage and hour law. To
begin a sketch of this new framework, this Article starts, in Section one,
by explaining the combination of historical factors that led to judicial
supervision of private FLSA settlement agreements. In Section two, this
article turns to the various approaches. to analyzing FLSA settlement
agreements in the district courts across the United States. Section three
3. 29 U.S.C. § 202.
,
"1
'
4. Id.
"
5. See Debra D. Burke & N. Leroy Kauffman, The Bona Fide ProfessionalExemption of the
FairLabor Standards Act as Applied to Accountancy, 14 J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 (2013) ("The

provisions intended to guarantee a living wage, as well as to encourage employers to hire more
workers and spread the available work, in an effort to avert the additional salary burden imposed if
their workers qualified for overtime.").
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 207. The FLSA has other mandates, besides ensuring mininium wage
and overtime requirements are met, although some argue that it does not go far enough. See
Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock & Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low-Wage Work, 50 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. L, 14-15 (2015) (noting that the FLSA "mandates a minimum hourly wage,
requires premium overtime pay for work exceeding forty hours per workweek, prohibits child labor,
and requires employers to keep accurate time records" in arguing for failures in the FLSA).,
8. 29 U.S.C. § 216. Currently, this complaint is filed through the U.S. Department of
Labor's Wage and Hour Division ("WHD"). How to File a Complaint, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
WAGE & HOUR Div., https://www.dol.gov/whd/howtofilecomplaint.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2017).
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analyzes the conflicting interpretations that led to a split in the federal
circuits regarding judicial supervision of FLSA back wages settlement
agreements. Section four considers the arguments against the FLSA
supervisory requirement and provides a justification for supervision.
Section five proposes a new framework, based on a rebuttable
presumption, for analyzing and supervising FLSA settlement agreements
for back wages.

I. A UNIQUE

COMBINATION OF HISTORICAL FACTORS

The idea that judges must supervise all FLSA back wage settlement
agreements arose as a function of the judiciary's good-hearted attempts
to effectuate the legislative intent of the FLSA. 9 The idea, over time,
became a requirement within some circuits, and district courts in many
other circuits (having no guidance from their own circuits) cautiously
followed the rulings of those circuits that mandated supervision. 10 This
contemporary setting began in the 1940s with a series of U.S. Supreme
Court cases." Most pertinent of these is Brooklyn Savings Bank v.
O'Neil, in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the lack of an
express prohibition against waivers of FLSA liquidated damages did not
prevent a litigant, who waived liquidated damages in a private
settlement, from recovering them.' 2 The Court examined the lack of an
9. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945); Walling v. Helmerich
& Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 575, 577
(1942).
10. See infra Section II1.
11. This series of cases began with Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. at 577
("If overtime pay may have this effect upon commerce, private contracts made before or after the
passage of legislation regulating overtime cannot take the overtime transactions from the reach of
dominant constitutional power." (internal citations and quotations omitted)), which continued with
Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. at 42 ("The Act clearly contemplates the setting of the
regular rate in a bona fide manner through wage negotiations between employer and employee,
provided that the statutory minimum is respected. But this freedom of contract does not include the
right to compute the regular rate in a wholly unrealistic and artificial manner so as to negate the
statutory purposes. Even when wages exceed the minimum prescribed by Congress, the parties to
the contract must respect the statutory policy of requiring the employer to pay one and one-half
times the regular hourly rate for all hours actually worked in excess of forty. Any other conclusion
in this case would exalt ingenuity over reality and would open the door to insidious disregard of the
rights protected by the Act."), and then came Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 715.. A
line of case law from the Supreme Court also holds that FLSA rights supersede conflicting
provisions of collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning
Co., 327 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1946); Walling v. Hamischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1945);
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 166-67, 170 (1945); Tennessee Coal, Iron
& R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 601-03 (1944).
12. See Brooklyn Sa. Bank, 324 U.S. at 715-16.
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express provision, as well as the lack of specific legislative intent, before
concluding that the overarching policies of the FLSA and congressional
history "clearly shows that Congress did not intend that an employee
should be allowed to waive his right to liquidated damages., 13 It was
within the analysis of these policies that circuit courts later found
justification for mandating
judicial supervision of all FLSA back wages
14
settlement agreements.
The policies examined in Brooklyn Savings Bank by the Supreme
Court were broadly construed to ensure the purpose of the FLSA was
met.15 First, prohibiting waivers of liquidated damages is necessary to
protect the vulnerable employee population that is subjugated by the
more powerful employer class. 16 Second, liquidated damages constitute
"a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum
on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers."' 17 Third, FLSA rights are of a private-public nature, and "a
statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public
interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release
contravenes the statutory policy."' 8 Fourth, prohibiting waivers of
liquidated damages promotes the policy of "uniformity in the application
of the provisions of the Act."' 19 These policies allowed the Supreme
Court to determine that Congress did not intend to allow waivers of
liquidated damages in FLSA claims.2 °
One year after Brooklyn Savings Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided in D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi that private settlements, which
resolve the issue of whether employees are covered by the FLSA, also
violate these policies. 2 ' The Court noted that the "reasons which lead us
to conclude that compromises of real disputes over coverage which do
not require the payment in full of unpaid wages and liquidated damages
do not differ greatly from those which led us to condemn the waivers of

13.

Id. at 706.

14.
15.

See id.
Id.

16. Id. at 706-07.
17. Id. at 707 (internal quotations omitted).
18. Id. at 704; see also id. at 710..("To allow contracts for waiver of liquidated damages
approximates situations where courts have uniformly held that contracts tending to encourage
violation of laws are void as contrary to public policy.").
19. Id. at 710.
20. d
21.

D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1946).
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liquidated damages... ". Justice Frankfurter dissented to this opinion
contending that "the 'policy' of a statute should be drawn out of its
terms, as nourished by their proper environment, and not, like nitrogen,
out of the air. ''2 3 Further, Justice Frankfurter's dissent revealed the
concern that the Supreme Court was reaching beyond legislative intent
in deciding these cases, stretching the language of the FLSA to support
its proffered view. 24 Despite Frankfurter's admonitions, thirty-five years
after Gangi, the Supreme Court again asserted that "FLSA rights cannot
be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would 'nullify
the purposes' of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was
By this time, the prohibition against
designed to effectuate." 2s
contravening FLSA policies via contract was well-engrained in decades
of jurisprudence.
Thus, in 1982, when the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was
tasked with deciphering whether an FLSA settlement agreement
involving a bona fide dispute over whether back wages were owed was
subject to judicial scrutiny, a body of judicially constructed policies and
precedent laid at its fingertips.2 6 In Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United
States, a Department of Labor ("DOL") investigation revealed that
Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. ("Lynn's") violated FLSA requirements
including the overtime, minimum wage, and record-keeping
provisions.2 7 Consequently, the DOL found Lynn's liable for both back
wages and liquidated damages.2 8 Following failed negotiation attempts
with the DOL, Lynn's attempted to negotiate directly with its
employees. 29 Fourteen employees agreed to settle directly with Lynn's
for a pro ratashare of $1000.00, which was offered as compensation for
an estimated $10,000.00 of unpaid back wages. 30 The DOL proceeded
to bring suit against Lynn's, claiming that the settlement agreement was
void. Subsequently, Lynn's filed an action for declaratory relief seeking
to have the settlement agreement declared enforceable. 31 The district
22.

Id.at 115.

23. Id. at 121-22 ("Before a hitherto familiar and socially desirable practice is outlawed,
where overreaching or exploitation is not inherent in the situation, the outlawry should come from
Congress. To that end, some responsibility at least for a broad hint to the courts, if not for
explicitness, should be left with Congress."). Justice Burton joined in this dissent. Id.
24. See id. at 121-22.
25. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981).
26. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).
27. Id. at 1352.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1351-52.
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court found that the settlement agreement violated the3 2policies and
provisions of the FLSA, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
In analyzing the enforceability of Lynn's settlement, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the same policies that Justice Frankfurter, decades
before, described as being pulled "out of the air," in his dissent in
Gangi,33 which were originally construed by the majority in Brooklyn
Savings Bank.34 In particular, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that
because "there are often great inequalities in bargaining power between
employers and employees, Congress made the FLSA's provisions
mandatory; thus, the provisions are not subject to negotiation or
bargaining between employers and employees. 35 Further, after a
stringent reading of 29 U.S.C. § 216, the Eleventh Circuit narrowly
carved out only two methods by which settlement for back wages can be
achieved under the FLSA.36 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that parties
may only settle FLSA back wages claims in the following ways: (i)
under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor; or (ii) under the scrutiny
and supervision of the courts.37 .Yet nowhere in the text of 29 U.S.C. §
216, which the Eleventh Circuit cites in support of these exclusive
methods of settling FLSA disputes, does the language expressly suggest
that private parties cannot settle FLSA disputes without the government
supervising private contractual affairs, nor does the statute expressly
38
require a court to scrutinize stipulated settlements brought before it.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit held that "to approve an 'agreement'
between an employer and employees outside of the adversarial context
of a lawsuit brought by the employees would be in clear derogation of
the letter and spirit of the FLSA. ' ' 39 - Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
refused to approve Lynn's agreement because it was neither supervised
by the Secretary of Labor nor was it devised in the context of judicial
oversight. 40 The decision in Lynn's Food reached beyond former
32.

Id.

.

33. See id.
at 1354 (citing D. A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121-22 (1946)).
34. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704-10 (1945).
35. Lynn's Food, 679 F.2d at 1352 (citing Brooklyn Say. Bank, 324 U.S. at 697).
36. Id. at 1352-53.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 1353. For these propositions, the court cites to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 29
U.S.C. § 216(c), which creates a right to file in state or federal court or with the Secretary of Labor
for violations of the FLSA. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(c)). These provisions do contain
mandatory language for clear and unambiguous violations of the FLSA, but do not contain vivid
language regarding judicial supervision of unclear or potential violations of the FLSA. Id.
39. Id. at 1354.
40. Id. at 1355 ("Other than a section 216(c) payment supervised by the Department of Labor,
there is only one context in which compromises of FLSA back wage or liquidated damage claims
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31

Supreme Court jurisprudence to prohibit an employer and FLSA covered
employee from negotiating a settlement regarding 41a bona fide dispute
over back wages without court or DOL supervision.
The invalidation of the settlement agreement in Lynn's under the
unique factual circumstances was the correct outcome, although the
Lynn's mechanism for invalidating the settlement, by finding it unfair
and unreasonable, has led to practical difficulties in district courts that
have followed in its progeny. In Lynn's, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a
transcript of the -settlement negotiations that was submitted by the
employer and found the transcript to reflect a "virtual catalog" of the
kinds of insidious employer tactics that the FLSA was created to
prevent.42 The transcript was submitted to show that the employees were
not pressured into the agreement, but (ironically) the Court found, to the
contrary, that the transcript revealed that Lynn's representative implied
that back wages were not really due to the employees; 43 said that if
wages were due, they would be much less than the DOL suggested;"
said that most people who received back wages from the DOL returned
the wages to the employer (suggesting that only "malcontents" would
keep their employer's money); 45 and also revealed that employees who
expressed discontent with the amount offered were not given the
opportunity to be heard. 46 The content of the transcript convinced the
Eleventh Circuit "of the necessity of a rule to prohibit such invidious
practices. ' 47 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit declared that settlement
agreements between an employer and a FLSA covered employee
involving back wages must be supervised by the DOL or a court to
ensure both fairness and reasonableness. 48 The invidious practices
reflected in the transcript, however, could have been voided through
traditional common law public policy mechanisms without mandating
49
that district courts examine settlements for fairness and reasonableness.
may be allowed: a stipulated judgment entered by a court which has determined that a settlement
proposed by an employer and employees, in a suit brought by the employees under the FLSA, is a
fair and reasonable resulution [sic] of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.").
41. See id. at 1354-55.
'42. Id. at 1354.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1354-55.
47. Id. at 1355.
48. Id.
49. See id Purportedly, the evidence set forth in the transcript could have revealed that the
settlement agreement violated public policy. Additionally, procedural unconscionability might have
been a basis for voiding the agreement, insofar as the process by which the employers attained the
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II. THE AFTERMATH OF LYNN'S FOOD

Following the 1982 decision in Lynn's Food, courts in the Eleventh
Circuit and across the country have struggled to decipher the amorphous
contours of a fair and reasonable, judicially approvable settlement. The
language in Lynn's Food that indicates when a settlement should be

approved by a district court includes concepts such as a "reasonable
compromise" of a "bona fide dispute," which may be approved "to
promote the policy of encouraging settlement of litigation., 50 This
language led to many lower courts devising a variety of tests to
determine if settlement agreements resolving bona fide disputes over
back wages should be approved.
Through the 1980s, most references to the Lynn's Food decision
involved questions of its applicability to unique circumstances. 5 By

settlement with the employees reflected advantage-taking over a vulnerable population. This,
combined with the unfair terms of the settlement, could have led to the contract being voided on the
grounds of unconscionability. See Keith William Diener, The Doctrine of Unconscionability: A
JudicialBusiness Ethics, 8 U.P.R. Bus. L.J. 103, 128 (2017). Other common law defenses, such as
duress or fraud may have also been available.
50. Lynn's Food, 679 F.2d at 1354 ("Settlements may be permissible in the context of a suit
brought by employees under the FLSA for back wages because initiation of the action by the
employees provides some assurance of an adversarial context. The employees are likely to be
represented by an attorney who can protect their rights under the statute. Thus, when the parties
submit a settlement to the court for approval, the settlement is more likely to reflect a reasonable
compromise of disputed issues than a mere waiver of statutory rights brought about by an
employer's overreaching. If a settlement in an employee FLSA suit does reflect a reasonable
compromise over issues, such as FLSA coverage or computation of back wages, that are actually in
dispute; we allow the district court to approve the settlement in order to promote the policy of
encouraging settlement of litigation. But to approve an 'agreement' between an employer and
employees outside of the adversarial context of a lawsuit brought by the employees would be in
clear derogation of the letter and spirit of the FLSA.")
51. See Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1986)
("Ordinarily there would be no need for a statute allowing settlement of a dispute between employer
and employees-people may resolve their own affairs, and an accord and satisfaction bars a later
suit. Yet the Fair Labor Standards Act is designed to prevent consenting adults from transacting
about minimum wages and overtime pay. Once the Act makes it impossible to agree on the amount
of pay, it is necessary to ban private settlements of disputes about pay. Otherwise the parties'
ability to settle disputes would allow them to establish, sub-minimum wages. Courts therefore have
refused to enforce wholly private settlements ....
Yet a prohibition of settlement ensures costly
litigation, even though the parties might be able to compromise their dispute without subverting the
principles of the statute. Section 16(c) creates the possibility of a settlement, supervised by the
Secretary to prevent subversion, yet effective to keep out of court disputes that can be compromised
honestly."); Barker v. Billo, No. 82-C-1548, 1984 WL 3171, at *6-7 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 1984)
(holding that accepting a check from employer in partial payment of unpaid wages does not
constitute a waiver of FLSA rights); Black v. Standard Oil Co., No. C83-220, 1983 WL 131195, at
*3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 1983) (finding that the situation in this case was not analogous to Lynn's
because the DOL did sufficiently supervise the settlement); Cedotal v. Forti, 516 So. 2d 405, 410
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1991, however, the Alaska Supreme Court utilized the reasoning of
Lynn's Food to require the supervision of liquidated damages claims
arising under its state laws. 52 Similar to Lynn's Food, the Alaska
Supreme Court examined the policies behind the Alaska Wage and Hour
Act ("AWHA") in deciding that private settlements of AWHA
liquidated damages claims are void as against public policy. 53 However,

unlike Lynn's Food, the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that the
liquidated damages provisions were intended to promote the policy of
punishing employers for violating the law.54 This policy is in distinct
opposition to the policy for liquidated damages articulated in Brooklyn
Savings Bank, which is to compensate injured employees for those
losses that are not easily quantifiable.55 Despite the conflicting policies,
the end result was the same-the mandated judicial supervision of
settlement agreements for back wages.
The Court of Appeals of Utah soon after followed the reasoning of
Lynn's Food to conclude that a private waiver of FLSA rights was
void. 56 Specifically, the court held that "waivers of FLSA rights which
are neither administratively supervised nor judicially approved are not
enforceable to bar a cause of action for unpaid overtime compensation.
Such waivers are against public policy and are unenforceable as a matter
of law."57 Thus, the progeny of Lynn 's Food continued to bar private
settlements of FLSA claims,58 but little guidance was available at the
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on Lynn's in deciding that a waiver not signed in the context of a
lawsuit does not waive an action by the employee against'the employer, and that the use of DOL
forms in effectuating the waiver did not constitute supervision by the Secretary of Labor); see also
Gormin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (M.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd, 963 F.2d 323
(1 lth Cir. 1992) (relying on Lynn's in holding unsupervised ADEA waivers invalid, but the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding them not per se invalid).
52. See McKeown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 820 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Alaska 1991) ("[P]ermitting
private settlement of liquidated damages claims under the AWHA is contrary to the strong policy
behind the AWHA and its liquidated damages provisions.").
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1070-71.
55. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) ("[T]he liquidated damage
provision is not penal in its nature but constitutes compensation for the retention of a workman's
pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by
liquidated damages." (citing Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942)).
56. See Druffner v. Mrs. Fields, Inc., 828 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
57. Id. at 1080.
58. See Hampton v. Am. Plumbing & Sewer, Inc., No. 95 C 1836, 1996 WL 3966, at *1 (N.D.
Ill.
Jan. 3, 1996), aff'd, 95 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, an employer alleged that he
called the employee after the FLSA lawsuit was filed and that they agreed the suit would be dropped
in exchange for the employer forgiving money the employee allegedly owed him. Id. As a result,
the employer did not respond to the complaint, and the employee attained a default judgment. Id.at
*1-2. The employer could not vacate the default judgment on the basis of his purported defense of
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time to instruct lower courts as to when a judicially supervised
settlement of a bona fide dispute over back wages should be approved.
Through the 1990s and the 2000s, courts across the country
continued to struggle with deciphering the contours of a fair and
reasonable settlement as per Lynn's Food's instructions. Throughout
this period, courts saw a substantial uptick in the number of FLSA
claims filed, a trend that continued into the subsequent decades. 59 As the
case load increased, more and more courts grappled with the ambiguous
language left by the Lynn's Food decision, which led courts to devise
inconsistent rules for analyzing the reasonableness and fairness of FLSA
As the case law developed, albeit
settlement agreements.6 °
inconsistently across the nation, four aspects of a settlement agreement
became the key areas of scrutiny in the approval of FLSA back wages
settlements for FLSA covered employees: (i) the existence of a bona fide
dispute; (ii) the reasonableness and fairness of the settlement to the
employee; (iii) the potential the settlement will frustrate the
implementation of the FLSA in the 61 workplace; and (iv) the
reasonableness of attorney's fees and costs.
A. The Existence of a Bona Fide Dispute
Judicial approval of a settlement agreement for FLSA back wages,
that does not include a provision mandating payment of the entire
waiver because it was not a meritorious defense since private settlements of FLSA claims are not
enforceable. Id.
59. See, e.g., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, FLSA Cases 1990, 1993-1999, 2000-2014, GraphBased on
Federal
Judicial
Caseload
Statistics,
http://www.wagehourlitigation.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/215/2014/05/FLSA-Cases-20141.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (showing
fairly consistent, year-after-year increases in the numbers of FLSA court cases from the early 1990s
to 2014 with a significant jump in filings circa 2003 and beyond); see also Anthony R. McClure,
Number of New FLSA Lawsuits Filed Each Year Continues to Rise, ABA LITIGATION NEWS, (Oct.
14, 2010), -https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top-stories/101410-rise-in-flsaemployment-and-labor.html (utilizing PACER statistics to show increasing numbers .of FLSA
lawsuits); see also Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Another Year, Another All Time High for Wage and Hour
Litigation, http://www.wagehourlitigation.com/overtimelanther-year-another-high/
(last visited
Dec. 28, 2017) (showing the increase in claims from 2000 to 2015); SEAN FARHANG, THE
LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 12-14 (2010)

(showing the uptick in private statutory litigation between the 1940s and early 2000s).
60. See Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1986); Barker v.
Billo, No. 82-C-1548, 1984 WL 3171, at *6-7 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 1984); Black v. Standard Oil Co.,
No. C83-220, 1983 WL 131195, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 1983); Cedotal v. Foiti, 516 So. 2d 405,
410 (La. Ct. App. 1987); see also Gormin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (M.D.
Fla. 1990), rev'd, 963 F.2d 323 (11 th Cir. 1992).
61. See Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).;
Hampton, 1996 WL 3966, at *2.
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35

amount of wages and liquidated damages, must be the result of a bona
This
fide dispute over whether those back wages are owed.62
requirement arises directly from the mandatory language of 29 U.S.C. §
216, which mandates employers to pay the full amount of back wages
owed and liquidated damages to injured employees.6 3 Consequently, a
bona fide dispute may involve either: (i) a dispute over whether any back
wages are owed to FLSA covered employees; or (ii) a dispute over the
amount of back wages. that are owed to FLSA covered employees.64
Although Brooklyn Savings Bank left this question open, in Gangi, the
Supreme Court answered -it in part by holding that private settlements
that resolve the issue of whether employees are covered by the FLSA are
impermissible, but the court did not resolve the related question of
whether private settlements of bona fide disputes between an employer
and a FLSA covered employee are permissible without court or DOL
supervision. 65 The Eleventh Circuit answered this question in Lynn's
Food by holding that such settlements of bona fide disputes must be
supervised by a ,court.6 6 However, Lynn's Food did not define a "bona
fide" dispute. Thus, district courts throughout the country were left to
determine on their own when a dispute was bona fide.
An employer that challenges liability or the amount of liability
under the FLSA simply to 'avoid payment to an employee does create a
dispute, but not a bona fide dispute. A "bona fide" dispute is a
disagreement that is genuine, legitimate, and made in good faith; it is not
merely the by-product of an employer trying to skirt well-established
laws or insincerely reduce the money it owes its employees.67
According to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, "[i]n essence, for a
bona fide dispute to exist, the dispute must fall within the contours of the
62. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
63. Id. ("Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title
shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages.," (emphasis added)).
64. Brooklyn Sai'. Bank v..O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 703 n.12 (1945) (referencing that there was
no bona fide dispute and notitig that "there was no discussion or dispute.., either as to the
existence of liability under the Act or as to the amount of such liability."); see also Kraus v. PA Fit
II, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("In essence, for a bona fide dispute to exist, the
dispute must fall within the contours of the FLSA and there must be evidence of the defendant's
intent to reject or actual rejection of that claim when it is presented.").
65. D. A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1946).
66. Lynn's Food,679 F.2d at 1352.
67. See
Bona
Fide,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/bona%20fide (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). The plain English definition of
"bona fide" includes: (1) "made in good faith without fraud or deceit"; (2) "made with earnest
intent: sincere"; and (3) "neither specious nor counterfeit: genuine." Id.
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FLSA and there must be evidence of the defendant's intent to reject or
actual rejection of that claim when it is presented. 6 8 Thus, there must
be some legitimate controversy over whether money is owed or the
amount of money owed (that does not relate to whether the employee is
covered by the FLSA) in order for a dispute to be bona fide. 9
In Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., the Western District of
Texas began to move away from the holding in Lynn's Food.70 After an
exhaustive analysis of the statutory and case history of the issue, the
Martinez court diverged from the majority in deciding that "parties may
reach private compromises as to FLSA claims where there is a bona fide
dispute as to the amount of hours worked or compensation due. A
release of a party's rights under the FLSA is enforceable under such
circumstances. 71 In Martinez, the defendants provided a means of
calculating the amount of money owed to the plaintiff, and deemed that
amount at a little over $500.00, yet the plaintiff claimed that he was
owed over $3000.00 in unpaid overtime compensation. 72 The parties
settled the disagreement, without court or DOL supervision, for
$1000.00. 7' The disagreement as to the amount owed was enough for
the Martinez court to deem the dispute as bona fide, and thus enforce the
settlement agreement.74 The private settlement that was agreed to
without DOL supervision and outside the boundaries of litigation was
deemed enforceable in Martinez because it was the product of a bona
fide dispute, and did not otherwise contravene the FLSA.7'
Following Martinez, some attorneys attempted to argue that their
private FLSA settlements no longer required court approval. For
example, in Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., the Middle District of Florida
grappled with the progeny of Martinez in light of Lynn's Food.76 The

68. Kraus, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 530. Although the Third Circuit has not explicitly addressed
whether Lynn's Foodapplies in its circuit, many district courts in this circuit nevertheless apply the
Lynn's Food framework. See, e.g., Mabry v. Hildebrandt, No. CV 14-5525, 2015 WL 5025810, at
* 1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2015) (stating that while "it is unsettled in the Third Circuit whether a district
court needs to approve aprivate FLSA settlement," the court joins the majority of district
courts in
the Third Circuit by utilizing Lynn's framework).
69.

Kraus, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 530.

70. Martinez v.Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F.Supp. 2d 608, 633 (W.D.Tex. 2005) (citing
Lynn's Food,679 F.2d at1355).
71.

Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at631.

72. Id.at 631-32.
73. Id. at612.
74. Id. at 632.
75. Id.
76. Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 12316 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Martinez,
361 F.Supp. 2d at630).
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court commented that "[a]lthough leaving the definition of 'bona fide
dispute' unstated, Martinez decides that only a 'bona 'fide dispute' under
the FLSA is subject to private compromise and that, apparently, a
category of non 'bona fide' FLSA disputes requires approval by the
Department of Labor or the district court.",77 The Dees court went on to
say that "[o]n the other hand, Lynn's Food requires approval of each
FLSA compromise, regardless of the issue that underlies the
compromise. In practice, leaving an FLSA settlement to wholly private
resolution conduces inevitably to mischief." 78 The Dees court rejected
the reasoning of Martinez, calling it "dicey ' 79 and adopted the
requirement per Lynn's Food that FLSA settlement agreements require
either DOL or judicial supervision. 8° In so doing, the district court
acknowledged a truism which remains today, namely, that "an employer
undertakes the private resolution of an FLSA dispute at his peril. 81
In 2012, thirty years after the monumental Lynn's Food decision,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the reasoning in Martinez,
creating a split in the circuits as to the requirement of judicial approval
of bona fide disputes involving FLSA back wages.82 In Martin v. Spring
Break '83 Prods., L.L.C., a union negotiated compensation for alleged
monies not paid to film set workers.8 3 In deciding that the settlement
agreement was enforceable, the Fifth Circuit concluded that bona fide4
disputes over wages can be privately settled without court supervision.1
It determined that this was a bona fide dispute because there was
disagreement about the number of hours owed and proof-issues relating
to whether the workers had worked on the days they alleged. 85 The Fifth
Circuit not only applied the rationale of Martinez but also relied on its
1976 decision holding that private settlement agreements that give the
employees everything they are entitled to under the FLSA, as
enforceable. 86 The union and defendants had agreed in their settlement
77.
78.
79.

Id.at 1236 (citing Martinez, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 632).
Id.at 1236-37.
Id. at 1237.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012)
("Approving of this rationale, we hold that the payment offered to and accepted by Appellants,
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, is an enforceable resolution of those FLSA claims predicated
on a bona fide dispute about time worked and not as a compromise of guaranteed FLSA substantive
rights themselves.").
83. Id. at 249, 256.

84. Id. at 257.
85. Id. at255.
86. Id. at 255-56; see also Thomas v. Louisiana, 534 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976)
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agreement that the amount paid was the amount owed. 87 Thus, Martin,

in its adoption of the Martinez reasoning, provided an alternative to the
traditional Lynn's Food approach 8
The district courts, whether adopting the Lynn's Food standard or

the more lenient standard of Martin, must require evidence that a dispute
is bona fide and that a plaintiff is not waiving his or her FLSA rights
through settlement.8 9

In Archer v. TNT USA, Inc., for example, the

Eastern District of New York refused to approve a FLSA settlement
agreement because the parties had not submitted evidence of a bona fide
dispute. 90 Even though the settlement agreement was reached during
litigation and the employees were represented by counsel, there was no

evidence of a bona fide dispute, and therefore, the judge refused to
approve the settlement. 91 The court clearly articulated that even under
92
the Martin standard, there must still be evidence of a bona fide dispute.

However, the court granted leave to file the settlement agreement and a
memorandum of law in support of the approval of the settlement. 93 In
Carillo v. Dandan Inc., on the other hand, the D.C. District Court

determined a dispute was bona fide because there was disagreement over
("Settlement agreements have always been a favored means of resolving disputes. When fairly
arrived at and properly entered into, they are generally viewed as binding, final, and as conclusive
of rights as a judgment. We see no reason here to depart from the general rule. There is no problem
of disproportionate bargaining power when a settlement gives employees everything to which they
are entitled under the FLSA at the time the agreement is reached. Thus, the agreement is enforcible
[sic], and the lower court erred in setting it aside." (footnotes omitted)).
87. Martin, 688 F.3d at 256.
88. Id. at 254-55 (citing Martinez v. Bohls Beating Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631-33
(W.D. Tex. 2005)); see Fernandez v. A-1 Duran Roofing, Inc., No. 12-CV-20757, 2013 WL
684736, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2013) (explaining that approval is not necessary where "both
Parties were represented by counsel and therefore negotiated a settlement ... in an adversarial
proceeding"); Picemi v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925. F. Supp. 2d 368, 371-73 (E.D.N.Y.
2013); Smith v. Tri-City Transmission Serv., No. CV 12-01254-PHX-FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119428, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2012) ("It is no longer clear that a settlement of FLSA claims must
be approved by the court to be binding.
); see also Lliguichuzhea v. Cinema 60, LLC, 948 F.
Supp. 2d 362, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[l]t is not clear that judicial approval of an FLSA settlement is
legally required."). Note, however, that these New York cases were decided before the Cheeks
decision. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), cer. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 824, (2016). For this discussion, see infra Section HI.
89. See, e.g., Sarceno v. Choi, 66 F. Supp. 3d 157, '170 (D.D.C. 2014) ("The Court concurs
with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Martin that a private settlement of FLSA claims may be
enforceable, even if the settlement was reached without United States Department of Labor or
judicial supervision or approval, but only when the ageement resolves a bona fide dispute between
the parties and the terms of the settlement are fair and reasonable.").
90. Archer v. TNT USA, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 373,386-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
91. Id. at 387.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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the accuracy of the employees' time slips, whether on-the-jobtravel was
compensable, and if money was advanced to the employees.94 These
factors were sufficient for the court to deem the dispute bona fide and
not a mere waiver of statutory rights.9 5
Similarly, in Kraus v. PA Fit II, LLC, the plaintiff, a personal
trainer, alleged that she was not paid overtime for working over forty
hours per week and that she was also not compensated for her time
assessing potential clients who ultimately chose not to hire her.96 The
case settled without the defendants explicitly denying her allegations,
and so the court examined evidence proffered by the plaintiff to
determine if there was a bona fide dispute.97 The court described the
issue of a bona fide dispute as one that was "not obvious," but found
evidence of denial in the defendants' answer filed in a related
administrative hearing, and the terms of the settlement agreement
itself.98 Accordingly, the court deemed the dispute to be bona fide. 99
The preliminary determination of a bona fide dispute is necessary to
ensure that the statutory rights under the FLSA are not abrogated
through an insincere dispute and consequent settlement of claims for
back wages.1 °0 The district court must make the initial determination
about whether a dispute is bona fide before approving a settlement
agreement, and only if bona fide, when applying the majority rule of
Lynn's Food, should a court
go on to analyze the reasonableness and
01
fairness of the agreement.l
94. Carrillo v. Dandan Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 124, 133 (D.D.C. 2014).
95. See id.
96. See Kraus v. PA Fit I1, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 530-31 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
97. Seeid. at530-31.
98. Id. at 531-32 (finding that the combination of (i) the defendants' contentions that the
plaintiff was paid more than other personal trainers in the administrative hearing, and (ii) the
statement in the settlement agreement that "[d]efendants believe they acted lawfully and properly at
all times and in all respects and specifically deny any and all liability for the claims alleged by
Kraus, but desire to avoid further legal fees and expenses that necessarily will result from prolonged
litigation," to be sufficient evidence for a finding that the dispute was bona fide).
99. Id.
100. See Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc., 723 F.3d 1304, 1307 (1lth Cir. 2013) ("[T]he rule of Lynn's
Food applies to settlements between former employees and employers."); Silva v. Miller, 307 F.
App'x 349, 351 (11th Cir. 2009) (declining to consider what level ofjudicial oversight applies when
there is full satisfaction of a FLSA claim made, because, in this case, the settlement involved
attorney's fees to be deducted from the settlement, and so the claim was compromised, and not fully
satisfied under the FLSA); Niland v. Delta Recycling Corp., 377 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11 th Cir. 2004)
(confirming that judicial supervision is not needed when the DOL adequately supervises a
settlement); see also Rodrigues v. CNP of Sanctuary, LLC., 523 F. App'x 628, 629 (11 th Cir. 2013)
(denying interlocutory review and requesting clarification of standards of faimess relating to
scrutiny of FLSA settlement agreements, particularly non-monetary provisions).
101. See Morataya v. Nancy's Kitchen of Silver Spring, Inc., No. GJH-13-01888, 2016 WL
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B. The Reasonableness and Fairness of the Settlement to the
Employee
The amorphous concept of "reasonableness" has stumped the finest
of judicial minds for centuries. As the Arkansas Supreme Court
recognized, "[i]t is common knowledge that sometimes human actions
and reactions defy logical explanations. ' l2 In line with the complexities
of human rationality, a complex and diverse body of case law exists
across the district courts that addresses the reasonableness (and/or
fairness) of FLSA settlement agreements. The aim of this body of law is
to ensure that the more vulnerable employee-party to the agreement is
not taken advantage of by the more powerful employer-party when
compromising a settlement. 0 3 This is assured by judicial scrutiny of the
terms of the settlement agreement.
At a minimum, settlement
agreements involving a compromise over a bona fide dispute involving
back wages claims must be fair and reasonable to the employee. 1' 4 The
frameworks for deciphering reasonableness and associated applications
of those frameworks are varied, yet three generalized approaches are
present across the circuits: (1) multi-factored tests; (2) totality of the
circumstances tests; and (3) relevant circumstances tests. 10 5
1. Multi-Factored Tests
Many of the FLSA multi-factored tests are rooted in tests adopted
by courts to examine the fairness or reasonableness of class or collective

2990720, at *5 (D. Md. May 20, 2016) (deciding, although not in the context of settlement
approval, that a lack of good faith on the part of the employer in failing to adequately attempt to
calculate payment amounts in accordance with the requirements of the FLSA resulted in a finding
that the dispute was not bona fide); Rogers v. Sav. First Mortg., LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 624, 638 (D.
Md. 2005); see also Wright v. Carrigg, 275 F.2d 448, 449 (4th Cir. 1960) ("[P]lain and substantial
burden of persuading the court by proof that his failure to obey the statute was both in good faith
and predicated upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose upon him more than
a compensatory verdict." (quoting Rothman v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 201 F.2d 618, 620 (3d Cir.
1953))).
102. United Steelworkers of America v. Walden, 311 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Ark. 1958).
103. See Alison Frankel, Don't Even Bother Trying to Hide Wage-and-Hour Settlements
Before this N.Y Judge, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otcflsa/dont-even-bother-trying-to-hide-wage-and-hour-settements-before-this-n-y-judgeidUSKBN 1CI2LY.
104. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982).
105. The distinction between these three general categories of tests is utilized in this article
solely for ease of reference, and not to draw a firm analytic distinction. There is some overlap
among them, but also noteworthy differences.
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action settlements.10 6 In single or multi-plaintiff cases, the multifactored tests employed in class or collective actions are often modified
by district courts for the purposes of analyzing single or multi-plaintiff
settlement agreements. District courts in the second and third circuits
regularly utilize modified renditions of the class action factors, which
eliminate the factors irrelevant to non-class or collective cases.1 °7 In the
Third Circuit, the factors arise under Girsh, and are:
(1) The complexity, expense and likely duration of the
litigation ... ; (2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement... ; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the
amount of discovery completed ... ; (4) the risks of
establishing liability... ; (5) the risks of establishing
damages... ; (6) the risks of maintaining the class
action through the trial.. . ; (7) the ability of the
defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the
range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in the
light of the best possible recovery ... ; [and] (9) the
range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a
possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of
litigation... .08
These nine factors are often utilized by courts in the Third Circuit
°9
to analyze the reasonableness of FLSA settlement agreements.'
However, some district courts in the third circuit have expressed a
distaste for mechanically applying these factors in the single plaintiff
context because some of the factors are irrelevant. 10° As a result, some
106. The distinction between class and collective actions under the FLSA arises pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (collective actions) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (class actions). See Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 23. In either case,
employees must receive certification. For more on this topic, see Sam J. Smith & Christine M.
Jalbert, Certification-216(b)-CollectiveActions v. Rule 23 Class Actions & Enterprise Coverage
under the FLSA, ABA SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. (Nov. 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor-law/meetings/201 1/ac2011/084.
authcheckdam.pdf.
107. See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975).
108. Id. at 156-57 (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir.
1974)).
109. See Brumley v. Camin Cargo Control, Inc., Nos. 08-1798, 10-2461, 09-6128, 2012 WL
1019337, at *4-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2012).
110. Howard v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 197 F. Supp. 3d 773, 777 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("Thus,
[e]ven though Girsh may suggest the type of factors to be considered in assessing a private FLSA
settlement, courts need not fall into the alluring trap of mechanically applying Girsh simply because
it is the court's duty to assess whether the proposed agreement is fair and reasonable." (alteration in
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district courts within the third circuit apply a version of the relevant
circumstances test to decipher whether FLSA settlement agreements are
reasonable.1 11
Many courts in Florida and elsewhere utilize a six-factored test,
which is often applied to decipher the reasonableness of class action
settlements under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP")
23(e)(2):
(1) the existence of collusion behind the settlement; (2)
the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the
litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the
amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of
plaintiffs success on the merits; (5) the range
of
12
possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of counsel.
Courts are already devising a variety of multi-factored tests to
utilize in deciphering the reasonableness of FLSA settlement
agreements, resulting in inconsistent standards that apply to scrutinize
FLSA settlement agreements.
2.

Totality of the Circumstances Tests

Some district courts within the second circuit similarly enunciate a
list of factors that are relevant to the reasonableness or fairness of the
settlement agreement. In the aftermath of Cheeks v. FreeportPancake
House, Inc., a 2015 Second Circuit decision, which effectively required
parties to seek judicial or DOL approval of bona fide disputes over back
wages, significant uncertainty arose regarding the enforceability of
settlement agreements. 13 Consequently, many district courts in the
second circuit have since used the Wolinsky v. Scholastic factors to
determine the fairness of FLSA settlements. 14 Wolinsky, although

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
111. Id. For discussion of the relevant circumstances tests, see infra Section ll.B.3.
112. See, e.g., Velez v. Audio Excellence, Inc., No. 6:10-cv-1448-Orl-22GJK, 2011 WL
4460110, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2011); see Camp v. City of Pelham, No. 2:10-cv-01270, 2014
WL 1764919, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 2014); Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1241
(M.D. Fla. 2010); Lomascolo v. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc., No. 1:08cv1310 (AJT/JFA), 2009 WL
3094955, at *10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2009); see also Carrillo v. Dandan Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 124, 132
(D.D.C. 2014).
113. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 203, 206 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 824 (2016).
114. Wolinsky v. Scholastic, 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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technically a "totality of the circumstances test," analyzes a list of

factors.'

15

It also cites to a case utilizing the City of Detroit v. Grinnell

factors, the case from which the Girsh factors originated.

16

Wolinsky

also incorporates other factors, and in particular, the court instructed
that:
In determining whether the proposed settlement is fair
and reasonable, a court should consider the totality of
circumstances, including but not limited to the following
factors: (1) the plaintiffs range of possible recovery; (2)
the extent to which the settlement will enable the parties
to

avoid

anticipated

burdens

and

expenses

in

establishing their respective claims and defenses; (3) the
seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the parties;

(4) whether the settlement agreement is the product of
arm's-length bargaining between experienced
counsel;
1 17
collusion.
or
fraud
of
possibility
the
(5)
and
Wolinksy clearly provides that these factors are not exclusive, but
instead that all relevant circumstances should be considered.' 18
Wolinsky thus provides something of a hybrid of a multi-factored test

and a totality of the circumstances test because it lists key factors, yet
indicates that the totality of circumstances should be considered.1

19

115. Id.at335.
116. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) ("(1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation;
(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6)
the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to
withstand a larger judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the
best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible
recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation."); see also Alleyne v. Time Moving &
Storage Inc., 264 F.R.D. 41, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
117. Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
118. Id. The court goes on to note that
"[g]iven the purposes of the FLSA, factors that weigh against approving a
settlement also include the following: (1) the presence of other employees
situated similarly to the claimant; (2) a likelihood that the claimant's
circumstance will recur; (3) a history of FLSA non-compliance by the same
employer or others in the same industry or geographic region; and (4) the
desirability of a mature record and a pointed determination of the governing
factual or legal issue to further the development of the law either in general or
in an industry or in a workplace."
Id. at 336 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
119. See id.
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Although, Wolinksy provides some guidance as to what
circumstances should be considered in a totality of the circumstances
analysis, in addition to the Girsh factors, some courts take a more liberal
approach to the totality of the circumstances, generally identifying in a
non-mechanical way the relevant considerations, if any, regarding the
reasonableness of the FLSA settlement agreement. The D.C. District
Court, for example, examined both the multi-factored approach to
deciphering fairness and reasonableness, and the totality of the
circumstances approach, and opted to utilize the totality of the
circumstances approach because the "flexibility in this approach gives
courts the ability to examine a settlement globally, rather than adhering
to a list of enumerated factors compiled to effectuate another regime and
designed to protect absent members of a class ...,12 In determining
reasonableness, however, and in consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, the D.C. District Court analyzed, among other things,
whether the settlement was the result of the employer's overreaching, if
it was a product of arm's length negotiations between attorneys, and
whether there were any "serious impediments" to the plaintiffs ability to
collect the judgment. 121 These factors, however, are just a starting point,
and not an end point, to the analysis of whether a FLSA settlement is fair
and reasonable.
3. Relevant Circumstances Tests
The relevant circumstances test is a variation of the totality of the
circumstances test insofar as it suggests that any circumstances that are
relevant to the fairness and reasonableness of the agreement should be
considered. 122 However, unlike the totality of the circumstances test,
123
this test does not include an enunciation of factors for consideration.
At least one district court sitting in the Third Circuit has adopted this test
through an order signed on January 11, 2016, the same day that the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Cheeks.124 On this day, the Eastern
120. Carrillo v. Dandan Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 124, 133 (D.D.C. 2014).
121. Id. at 132-35.
122. Compare Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding that the
application of the "relevant factors" used to approve the settlement was nonetheless relevant to
determine whether the proposed settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable), with Wolinsky, 900
F. Supp. 2d at 335 ("In determining whether the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable, a court
should consider the totality of circumstances ....
123. Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
124. See Kraus v. PA Fit II, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 530, 532-33 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that in
evaluating the fairness and reasonableness of a proposed settlement agreement, a court cannot solely
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District of Pennsylvania signed an order requiring the judicial approval
of FLSA settlement agreements through a test that is still developing in
its jurisprudence. 25 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania explicitly

rejects the mechanical application of the multi-factored tests, such as
those found in Girsh,126 and instead focuses its inquiry on whatever may
be relevant to the instant case. 127 Some such relevant considerations
include whether the compensation terms are "significant," whether
representing counsel understands the merits and risks of the case, and the
"balancing the likelihood of success against the benefit of a certain
settlement. 12 8 In essence, the relevant circumstances test identifies
those factors that are relevant to the particular settlement, and analyzes
them without mechanically considering all factors of a multi-factored

test.
Some district courts sitting in the sixth circuit similarly apply a

relevant circumstances test to decipher the fairness and reasonableness
of FLSA settlement agreements. 129 Of these circumstances, some courts

have given significant credence to the representations of counsel
involved in the litigation, because they have a unique understanding of
the complexities and merits of the case.

30

As in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, these district courts typically identify the relevant factors
from a pre-existing multi-factored
test, and only apply those factors
131
pertinent to the case at hand.
address whether "[a] proposed settlement resolves a bona fide dispute" but, must also examine the
entire record to determine whether or not the proposed settlement is fair to all of the parties involved
and does not "run contrary" to the "legislative intent, purpose and context of the FLSA."); see also
Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 824
(2016).
125. Kraus, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 524.
126. Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157; see also Howard v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 197 F. Supp. 3d 773, 777
n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Kraus, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 523-24 n.3).
127. Kraus, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 523 n.3.
128. Howard, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 778 ("Here, the Court finds that the compensation terms are
fair and reasonable because the settlement amount is significant in light of Plaintiff's claim.").
129. Gentrup v. Renovo Servs., LLC, No. 1:07-CV-430, 2011 WL 2532922, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
June 24, 2011) ("The court may choose to consider only factors that are relevant to the settlement at
hand and may weigh particular factors according to the demands of the case."); Redington v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 5:07-CV-1999, 2008 WL 3981461, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 22,
2008) ("The Court may choose to consider only those factors that are relevant to the settlement at
hand and may weigh particular factors according to the demands of the case."); see also Granada
Investments, Inc. v. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203, 1205 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Relevant factors framing
our inquiry include the likelihood of success on the merits, the risk associated with the expense and
complexity of litigation, and the objections raised by class members.").
130. Edwards v. City of Mansfield, No. 1:15-CV-959, 2016 WL 2853619, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
May 16, 2016).
131. Seeid.at*3.
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The variety of tests employed by district courts reveals how the
language imposed by Lynn's Food has been interpreted in a variety of
ways across the U.S., leading to inconsistent standards and thus
diminishing predictability when it comes to the approval of the terms of
FLSA settlement agreements for back wages.
C. The Potentialthe Settlement Will Frustratethe Implementation of
the FLSA in the Workplace
This factor largely relates to the non-monetary provisions and
circumstances of a FLSA settlement agreement for back wages. When
examining whether a settlement agreement will frustrate the
implementation of the FLSA in the workplace, courts often review the
confidentiality provisions of settlement agreements, waiver of claims
(release) provisions of settlement agreements, and any other provisions
and external circumstances that might undermine the purposes of the
FLSA.132
Courts regularly hold confidentiality provisions in FLSA settlement
agreements to frustrate the purposes of the FLSA. The general rule is
that FLSA settlement agreements cannot contain confidentiality
provisions because a
confidentiality agreement, if enforced, (1) empowers an
employer to retaliate against an employee for exercising
FLSA rights, (2) effects a judicial confiscation of the
employee's right to be free from retaliation for asserting
FLSA rights, and (3) transfers to the wronged employee
a duty to pay his fellow employees for the FLSA wages
unlawfully withheld by the employer. This unseemly
prospect vividly displays the inherent impropriety of a
confidentiality
agreement in settlement of an FLSA
133
dispute.

Although the general rule holds, some courts have allowed
confidentiality provisions when such provisions are uniquely crafted.
Thus, there are a few exceptions to the general rule that have developed
in common law. For example, confidentiality agreements tailored to

132. Kraus, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 532-33; see also Bettgerv. Crossmark, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-2030,
2015 WL 279754, at *8-10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2015).
133. Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
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ensure that the employer has no means of retaliating against the
employee for breaching the confidentiality provision have been held
permissible. 134 Further, reasonably tailored non-disparagement clauses
have been held not to frustrate the purposes of the FLSA. 135 In one case,
a confidentiality provision was upheld when it only prohibited the
plaintiff from discussing the case with the press and the media, while
simultaneously leaving the agreement in public record and permitting
the employee to discuss the agreement with other employees. 136 Inother
cases, settlement agreements are approved regardless of confidentiality
provisions, and the court
sua sponte severs the provision when
137
approving the agreement.

Releases of claims in FLSA settlement agreements are also often
scrutinized by courts. Courts recurrently hold general releases of all
claims to be impermissibly broad. 38 FLSA settlement agreements
should typically only provide for a release of the wage and hour claims
at issue (e.g., FLSA claims and, when appropriate, any equivalent state
law wage claims).1 39 The narrow waiver of FLSA claims, however,
cannot be prospective, but can only waive past claims. 140 In essence, the
release of claims must only relate to past claims arising under the FLSA,
within the scope of the instant lawsuit.
Aside from releases and confidentiality provisions, courts may
examine other provisions or circumstances that may indicate that the
purposes of the FLSA may be undermined. These circumstances may
include whether this employer or this particular industry has a "history

134. Schwartz v. Pa. State Univ., No. 4:15-CV-02176, 2017 WL 1386251, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 18, 2017).
135. Mabry v. Hildebrandt, No. CV 14-5525, 2015 WL 5025810, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24,
2015) ("[T]he Court notes that the non-disparagement clause of the Settlement Agreement does not
frustrate the purposes of the FLSA.").
136. In re Chickie's & Pete's Wage & Hour Litig., No. 12-6820, 2014 WL 911718, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 7, 2014); ef Diclemente v. Adams Outdoor Advert., Inc., No. CV 3:15-0596, 2016 WL
3654462, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 8, 2016) (finding the confidentiality provision permissible when it
allowed communications with "spouse, significant other, immediate family, attorney, accountant
and/or tax consultant, or as otherwise required by law" but the plaintiffs could also "disclose that
this case has been resolved without referencing the terms of the agreement"); Mabry, 2015 WL
5025810, at *2-3 (holding confidentiality provisions that allowed plaintiff to talk only with spouse
about settlement agreement too extreme, even though not fully restrictive).
137. See, e.g., Altenbach v. Lube Ctr., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-02178, 2013 WL 74251, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 4, 2013) (granting joint motion for approval of settlement agreement excepting the
confidentiality provision because.it frustrates the implementation of the FLSA in the workplace).
138. See Howard v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 197 F. Supp. 3d 773, 779 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Kraus v. PA
Fit I, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 532-33 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
139. See, e.g., Howard, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 779-80; Kraus, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 532-33.
140. Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
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situated"

Additionally, some courts have further considered
employees. 141
"whether there is a likelihood that the circumstances giving rise to this
action will recur., 142 There is relatively broad discretion attributed to

the district courts to scrutinize settlement agreements and the
surrounding circumstances to ensure that the purposes of the FLSA are
not contravened. 143

Accordingly, there is no provision in a FLSA

settlement agreement for back wages that is immune to144the potential that
it will delay or even undermine a proffered settlement.
D. The Reasonableness of Attorneys' Fees and Costs

District courts regularly scrutinize settlement agreement provisions
regarding attorneys' fees and costs. The FLSA contains a fee-shifting

statute to ensure that a prevailing plaintiff can recover reasonable fees
and certain costs. 145 What constitutes a reasonable attorney fee is
regularly an issue of contention, 146 and this perennial concern is

magnified in the context of FLSA settlements. 14 District courts across
the circuits utilize a variety of nuanced tests to decipher if attorney's fees
are reasonable in the context of a specific case. Costs, however, for
federal court actions, are generally deemed to be those costs enumerated

141. Sapp v. Linked Commc'ns, No. 3:12CV245/MCR/EMT, 2014 WL 1584491, at *1 (N.D.
Fla. Mar. 13, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12CV245/MCR/EMT, 2014 WL
1584497 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2014).
142. Herring v. Thunder Ridge Trucking & Filtration, Inc., No. 15-CV-00062-RM-KLM, 2016
WL 7868819, at *2 (D. Colo. May 24, 2016).
143. See cases cited infa note 144.
144. See Guareno v. Vincent Perito, Inc., No. 14cv1635, 2014 WL 4953746, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2014) (finding a settlement agreement unenforceable, in part, because plaintiff's attorney
must pledge not to "represent any person bringing similar claims against Defendants," noting that
"[s]uch a provision raises the specter of defendants settling FLSA claims with plaintiffs, perhaps at
a premium, in order to avoid a collective action or individual lawsuits from other employees whose
rights have been similarly violated"); see also Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc., 723 F.3d 1304, 1306 (1 lth
Cir. 2013) (involving an employee who was pressured to accept settlement because "she trusted [the
employer] and she was homeless at the time and needed money" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Walker v. Vital Recovery Servs., Inc., 300 F.R.D. 599, 600 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 2014)
("According to Plaintiff's counsel, twenty-two plaintiffs accepted the offers ofjudgment-many for
$100-because 'they are unemployed and desperate for any money they can find. "').
145. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) ("The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant,
and costs of the action.").
146. See generally Keith William Diener, A Battle for Reason: The UnconscionableAttorneyClientFee Agreement, 2016 J. PROF. LAWYER 129 (2016).
147. See cases cited infa note 157.
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in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.148 Thus, while the determination of reasonable
costs is typically governed by clear-cut rules, the determination of

reasonable fees is governed by more flexible standards.
There are five major ways attorneys can charge clients' fees: the
percentage of recovery (contingency) fee, lodestar fee, hourly fee, flat
rate fee, or hybrid fee (some combination of the preceding, such as part
percentage and part hourly). 149 Regardless of the agreement terms
between the client and attorney, the fee must, in all circumstances,
satisfy the reasonableness standards prevailing in the relevant
jurisdiction. 150 These reasonableness requirements must presumably be

equivalent to or stricter than the reasonableness requirements of Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 (or the state promulgated equivalent of
this standard). 1 5'
The contingency fee is often utilized in FLSA and non-FLSA

contexts. In non-FLSA employment law contexts, contingency fees that
exceed a reasonable hourly rate are often permissible. 152 For example,
for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the U.S. Supreme

Court held that there is no per se ceiling on attorney compensation
arising from that statute, and so an attorney and client can contract for

148. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012) ("A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as
costs the following: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the
copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title."); see also
Mock v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 456 Fed. App'x. 799, 802 (11 th Cir. 2012) (citing Glenn v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1988)) (finding that costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) are those set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1920); Patel v. Shree Jalarm, Inc., No. 12-0224-KD-M,
2013 WL 5175949, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2013) (finding, however, when the defendant agrees
to pay costs in excess of those set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, then a court may find the costs
reasonable "in consideration of the overall agreement by the parties and the amount sought").
149. See generally Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profitfor Costs, 63 DEPAUL L.
REv. 587 (2014).
150. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
151. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (2009) (providing eight non-exclusive factors
for considering the reasonableness of a fee: "(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2)
the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by
the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent."); see also Diener, supranote 146, at 147-48.
152. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990).
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contingency fees that may exceed a reasonable hourly rate. 15 3 The
Supreme Court explicitly held that
[section] 1988 controls what the losing defendant must
pay, not what the prevailing plaintiff must pay his
lawyer. What a plaintiff may be bound to pay and what
an attorney is free to collect under a fee agreement are
not necessarily measured by the "reasonable attorney's
fee" that a defendant must pay pursuant to a court order.
Section 1988 itself does not interfere
with the
154
enforceability of a contingent-fee contract.
Although section 1988 itself does not limit a contingent fee, the
state rules of professional conduct do place the outermost limits upon
permissible fees arising under this statute.155 Although outside of FLSA
contexts such contingency fee arrangements are often permissible, the
FLSA places limits upon this contracting.
The freedom of an attorney and client to contract for contingency
fees that exceed the reasonable fee award under the FLSA is limited.
Courts that have considered the question have repeatedly held that
prevailing plaintiffs should receive full compensation, including back
wages and liquidated damages, without having to pay fees out of their
recovery. 5 6 To force the employee to pay attorneys' fees would
undermine the purpose of the FLSA and congressional intent.1 57 The

153. See id.
at 86-90 (noting that this includes claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, 1986).
154. Id.at 90.
155. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (2009).
156. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
157. Zegers v. Countrywide Mortg. Ventures, LLC, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267 (M.D. Fla.
2008) ("Because the FLSA was intended to provide workers with the full
compensation they are due
under the law, requiring a plaintiff to pay his or her attorney a fee in addition to what the Court
determines is a reasonable fee for the attorneys' services is contrary to Congressional intent."); see
Maddrix v. Dize, 153 F.2d 274, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1946) ("Obviously Congress intended that the
wronged employee should receive his full wages plus the penalty without incurring any expense for
legal fees or costs."); see also United Slate, Local 307 v. G & M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732
F.2d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Maddrix, 153 F.2d at 275-76); Skidmore v. John J. Casale,
Inc., 160 F.2d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 1947) ("We have considerable doubt as to the validity of the
contingent fee agreement; for it may well be that Congress intended that an employee's recovery
should be net, and that therefore the lawyer's compensation should come solely from the
employer."); Burke v. Mesta Mach. Co., 79 F. Supp. 588, 615 (W.D. Pa. 1948) ("Any agreement
between the plaintiffs and their counsel for an additional fee on a contingent basis, or any other
understanding, would be contrary to the purpose of Congress to have the employee collect and
return unpaid wages and liquidated damages.").
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Eleventh Circuit has even taken this analysis a step further, concluding
that contingency arrangements that are deducted from FLSA settlements
create a claim that is compromised, and thus subject to judicial
supervision. 158 In other words, for an injured employee to receive full
compensation in accordance with the FLSA, the employee must not be
forced to pay fees out of his statutorily mandated recovery, but instead
the employer should pay the fees (over and above the payment of back
wages and liquidated damages paid to the employee).
To decipher the reasonableness of a percentage of recovery method,
some courts employ a multi-factored test. Some courts in the third
circuit, 159 for example, apply the Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp.
factors for common fund cases:
(1) the size of the fund created and the number of
persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence of
substantial objections by members of the class to the
settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3)
the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the
complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of
nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case
by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7) the awards in similar
cases. 160

Although, the Gunter factors need not be "applied in a formulaic
way" and, "[e]ach case is different, and in certain cases, one factor may
outweigh the rest.",161 These are nonetheless some of the relevant factors
that may be used to decipher the reasonableness of an attorney fee. In
lieu of a percentage of recovery fee, some courts employ the lodestar
method of calculating fees, or utilize the lodestar method as a crosscheck upon a contingency-based fee award, although this cross-check is
sometimes argued as outdated and inaccurate. 162 Regardless of the terms

158. Silva v. Miller, 307 F. App'x 349, 351 (11th Cir. 2009).
159. Crevatas v. Smith Mgmt. & Consulting, LLC, No. 3:15-2307, 2017 WL 1078174, at *5
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017).
160. Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000).
161. Id.
162. Altnor v. Preferred Freezer Servs., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 746, 766-67 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
("The lodestar crosscheck is performed by calculating the 'lodestar multiplier,' which is determined
by dividing the requested fee award by the lodestar. To determine the lodestar method's suggested
total, the court multiplies 'the number of hours reasonably worked on a client's case by a reasonable
hourly billing rate for such services.'" (internal citations omitted)); see also Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563-68 (1986), supplemented, 483
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of the attorney-client fee agreement, a district court supervising a FLSA
settlement must ensure that the fee is reasonable and that it is paid over
and above the employee's statutory entitlements, and not out of it. 163
In summary, in the aftermath of Lynn's Food, the district courts
across the circuits have devised a variety of approaches to deciphering
the existence of a bona fide dispute, the reasonableness and fairness of
settlements, whether a settlement agreement frustrates the
implementation of the FLSA in the workplace, and whether attorneys'
fees and costs are reasonable.64 The variety of methodologies utilized
particularly to decipher the fairness and reasonableness of agreements
has led to inconsistencies in the application of FLSA provisions,
diminishing predictability as to the potential for enforcement of FLSA
settlement agreements, and, disharmony in the application of the FLSA
across the United States. Thus, while attempting to ensure that one of
the policies identified in Brooklyn Savings Bank is fulfilled, that is, the
protection of the vulnerable employee population, courts have
contravened another policy identified, namely, the "uniformity in the
application of the provisions of the Act."' 165 The next section discusses
how these, and related policies have similarly played a role in creating a
circuit court split.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT: POLICIES IN CONFLICT
In framing the controversy over the requirement of judicial
supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages, one must be
cautious not to over-extend the contours of the circuit court split or
exaggerate its scope. The question left open by the U.S. Supreme Court
is a narrow one. Although a narrow question, it is one with vast
implications for FLSA practice, viz., whether private settlements of bona
fide disputes for back wages between an employer and a FLSA covered
employee are enforceable when reached without court or DOL
supervision? 166 The Eleventh Circuit in Lynn's Food answered this
U.S. 711 (1987).
163. See, e.g., Silva, 307 F. App'x at 3 51.
164. See, e.g., Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1238-43 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
165. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
166. Id. at 714 ("Our decision.., has not necessitated a determination of what limitation, if
any, § 16(b) of the [FLSA] places on the validity of agreements between an employer and employee
to settle claims arising under the Act if the settlement is made as the result of a bona fide dispute
between the two parties, in consideration of a bona fide compromise and settlement."); see D. A.
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1946) ("Nor do we need to consider here the
possibility of compromises in other situation which may arise, such as a dispute over the number of
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question in the negative, holding that all FLSA settlements for back
wages must be supervised by either a court or the DOL. 16 7 The Fifth
Circuit accepted the general rule expressed by Lynn's Food, but carved
out an exception to it. 168 It is this exception that has created a split in
how the circuits treat certain FLSA settlement agreements.
The
exception essentially holds that when a dispute is bona fide, if both
parties are represented by counsel and the agreement does not otherwise
contravene the FLSA, then private settlement agreements for FLSA
back
169
wages are enforceable even without court or DOL supervision.
The current landscape is one leaning heavily in favor of the blanket
70
The Eleventh 71 and Second 172 Circuits
rule imposed by Lynn's Food.1

require judicial supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for back
wages; the Fifth Circuit 173 carves out a narrow exception to the
supervisory requirement; the Fourth, 174 Seventh, 175 Eighth, 176 and
Ninth 177 Circuits have not expressly decided the issue, but have (in dicta)
hours worked or the regular rate of employment."); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) ("FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise
waived because this would 'nullify the purposes' of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it
was designed to effectuate.").
167. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (1lth Cir. 1982).
168. Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 255-56 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2012).
169. Id. at 256 & n.10.
170. Lynn's Food, 679 F.2d at 1355.
171. Id. at 1350.
172. Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S.Ct. 824 (2016).
173. Martin, 688 F.3d at 255-56.
174. Although the Fourth Circuit has not expressly decided the issue, it has acknowledged the
prohibition in Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. 493 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[U]nder the
FLSA, a labor standards law, there is a judicial prohibition against the unsupervised waiver or
settlement of claims."). However, Taylor was overruled by regulation as stated in Whiting v. Johns
Hopkins Hospital. 416 Fed. App'x. 312, 314-15 (4th Cir. 2011).
175. Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 308 (7th Cir. 1986). The Seventh
Circuit declined to address, for lack of need in DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee. 189 F.3d 650, 653
(7th Cir. 1999) ("[The Supreme Court] has not decided 'what limitation, if any, § [2]16(b) of the
Act places on the validity of agreements between an employer and employee to settle claims arising
under the Act if the settlement is made as the result of a bona fide dispute between the two parties.
(second alteration in original) (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 714 (1945))).
176. The Eighth Circuit cited Lynn's Food approvingly in Copeland v. ABB, Inc. 521 F.3d
1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2008) ("There are only two statutory exceptions to this general rule. First, an
employee may accept payment of unpaid wages under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor and
if the back wages are paid in full. Second, if an employee brings suit directly against a private
employer pursuant to § 216(b) of the statute, and the district court enters a stipulated judgment, it
will have res judicata effect on any subsequent claim for damages." (intemal citations omitted)).
177. The Ninth Circuit cited Lynn's Food approvingly in Seminiano v. Xyris Enterprise,Inc.
602 F. App'x 682, 683 (9th Cir. 2015) ("The record also supports the district court's denial of
Seminiano's request to settle and dismiss his FLSA claims. FLSA claims may not be settled
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acknowledged the requirement of supervision; and the First, 178 Third, 179
Sixth,18 ° Tenth, 18 1 and District of Columbia 18 2 Circuits having not yet

expressly addressed the issue. Although, cutting against this trend, the
Federal Circuit1 83 announced a rule that relaxes the supervisory
requirements for public (federal) employees. Thus, across the circuits
there is considerable room for the existing circuit court split to widen as
more circuits explicitly address the issue. The current landscape is
summarized in Table I, and the conflicting 84
policies that led to this split
are examined in the paragraphs that follow.

without approval of either the Secretary of Labor or a district court."); see also Juvera v. Salcido,
No. CV-1 1-2119-PHX-LOA, 2013 WL 6628039, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2013) ("While the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has not specifically addressed the procedure to settle FLSA claims,
numerous district courts throughout the Ninth Circuit have followed the lead in the seminal case of
Lynn's Food Stores.").
178. City P'ship Co. v. Atl. Acquisition Ltd. P'ship, 100 F.3d 1041, 1043 (1st Cir. 1996).
While not explicitly addressing FLSA settlement, the general rule in the First Circuit is that "[a]
district court can approve a class action settlement only if it is fair, adequate and reasonable. When
sufficient discovery has been provided and the parties have bargained at arms-length, there is a
presumption in favor of the settlement." Id.(internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, some district
courts inthe First Circuit do supervise FLSA settlements. See Prescott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., No. 2:09-cv-00322-DBH, 2011 WL 6662288, at *1 (D. Me. Dec. 20, 2011) ("[Iln the FLSA
context, for an employee's waiver of his rights to unpaid wages and liquidated damages to be
binding, either the U.S. Secretary of Labor must supervise the settlement or a court must approve
it."); see also Singleton v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Mass. 2015).
179. Stickel v. SMP Servs., LLC., No. 1:15-cv-00252, 2016 WL 827126, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
1, 2016) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not addressed the factors
district courts should weigh when evaluating FLSA settlements. However, courts within this circuit
have relied on the considerations set forth in Lynn's Food ....
").
180. Steele v. Staffnark Investments, LLC, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1026 (W.D. Tenn. 2016)
("The Sixth Circuit has yet to rule definitively on the question .... [T]his Court finds that FLSA
settlements require approval .... ").
181. District courts in the tenth circuit routinely apply the Lynn's Food standards even though
the Tenth Circuit has not explicitly addressed the issue. See, e.g., Baker v. Vail Resorts Mgmt. Co.,
No. 13-cv-01649-PAB-CBS, 2014 WL 700096, at *1 (D. Colo.Feb. 24, 2014).
182. Carrillo v. Dandan Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2014) ("The D.C. Circuit has not
opined about whether judicial approval is required of FLSA settlements reached after an FLSA suit
has been filed or the related issue of whether such approval is a prerequisite for subsequent judicial
enforcement of a private settlement.").
183. See O'Connor v. United States, 308 F.3d 1233, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2002); McCall v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 839 F.2d 664, 668-69 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
184. There is a bit of grey area between the last two categories, regarding whether or not a
court has acknowledged the requirement for supervision or not expressly decided the issue. For
example, some circuits have affirmed district court cases that have supervised settlement
agreements, when the question of whether supervision is required was not before them. Thus, the
last two categories may overlap to some degree. See, e.g., Lenahan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No.
02-0045, 2006 WL 2085282, at *12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2006), aff'd, 266 F. App'x 114 (3d Cir. 2008).
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TABLE 1:
Supervision of
FLSA
settlement
agreements
required in all
circumstances

Supervision of
FLSA
settlement
agreements
not
always
required

Acknowledged
the requirement
of supervision
but have not
expressly
decided the issue

Have not
expressly
decided the
issue

Eleventh Circuit
Second Circuit

Fifth Circuit
Federal Circuit

Fourth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit

First Circuit
Third Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
DC Circuit

A. The Martin Exception to the Supervisory Requirement
In Martin, the Fifth Circuit intricately analyzed the U.S. Supreme
Court's jurisprudence pertaining to FLSA settlement agreements and
determined that the Supreme Court does not mandate the supervision of
all FLSA settlement agreements for back wages.185 To the contrary, the
Supreme Court expressly left open the question of whether bona fide
disputes between covered employees and employers over back wages.
(such as disputes over the number of hours worked or the regular rate for
employees) require supervision. 186 The Lynn's Food court looked to the
policies identified by the Supreme Court to impose such a requirement,
but the Martin court did not perceive those policies to be implicated
when FLSA rights are not abrogated through contract. The Martin court
reiterated "that FLSA substantive rights may not be waived in the
collective bargaining process, however, here, FLSA rights were not
waived, but instead, validated through a settlement of a bona fide
dispute ....
In such cases, judicial scrutiny of settlement
agreements is not required prior to those agreements becoming
188
enforceable and binding upon the parties.
The Martin ruling implies that agreements involving bona fide

185. Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012).
186. Id. at 255 (citing D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1946)).
187. Id. at 257.
188. Id. at 253-54.
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disputes become binding prior to receiving court approval, so long as
FLSA rights are not abrogated via agreement. 189 Thus, under Martin,
when competent parties represented by counsel agree to a settlement of a
bona fide FLSA dispute over back wages, the parties need not go
through the additional (sometimes tumultuous) process of seeking court
or DOL approval priorto effectuating the settlement. 190 However, if one
party later realizes the terms of the agreement are unfair, that party may
purportedly still bring claims to court to decipher whether such an
agreement was fair and reasonable (likely, either by filing a FLSA action
or by requesting declaratory relief).' 91 Thus, the Martin ruling's
consequence is largely the modification of the procedures for the
approval of FLSA settlements of bona fide disputes within the Fifth
Circuit. Instead of parties being required to seek approval prior to
effectuating the settlement of bona fide disputes, parties may instead
effectuate settlement, and subsequently, if necessary, bring an action to
court to decipher whether that agreement was fair, reasonable, and thus
enforceable. The risk for private FLSA settlements, even in the Fifth
Circuit, however, is that the agreement could eventually be scrutinized
and if FLSA rights were waived, even inadvertently through the private
settlement, then the agreement could be held void as against public
policy.

192

In this way, the Fifth Circuit has partially restored the

traditional common law methods for challenging a contract (via public
policy), and disposed of procedural hurdles for agreements that validate
FLSA rights. This, in turn, creates the potential for the reduction of
filings of FLSA cases and agreements in district courts.
The Martin court approved of the reasoning set forth by the
Western District of Texas in Martinez,193 and, in doing so, embraced the
freedom of contractual parties to craft their own agreements for bona
fide disputes, so long as such agreements do not violate the public
policies embedded in the FLSA (e.g., preventing the exploitation of
vulnerable employees by avoiding overtime or minimum wage
requirements). The Fifth Circuit gave primacy to party autonomy and
freedom of contract in lieu of the supervisory mechanisms set forth in
Lynn's Food, while still preserving the common law mechanisms for
voiding contracts that violate the FLSA's policies. 194 The procedure
189. Id. at 257.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 254.
192. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
193. Martinez v. Bohls Bearing Equip. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 608, 631-33 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
194.

Martin, 688 F.3d at 256 n.10.
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resulting from the Martin decision prevents courts from disrupting
settlements of consenting parties who agree to a resolution of a bona fide
dispute that they, the parties (as represented by counsel), think is fair and
reasonable, as opposed to an agreement that a presiding judge (who is
not intimately familiar with the circumstances, needs, and desires of the
parties) believes to be fair and reasonable. 195 Such compromises could
conceivably fall within a broad range of potential settlements, so long as
FLSA rights are not waived in the process of settlement, and the policies
embedded therein are not abrogated.
Through the restoration of the traditional common law procedure
for voiding contracts when violative of public policy (i.e., the public
policies embedded in the FLSA), the Martin court has assured that
vulnerable employees are protected while reducing the strain on district
courts. 196
All the while, competent attorneys that craft private
settlements outside of the purview of court supervision, will regardless
require such agreements to validate the FLSA lest they shall face having
those agreements voided if subsequently challenged. 197 Thus, although
courts in the fifth circuit may not have immediate opportunity to review
FLSA settlement agreements, they will ultimately be able to review
them if challenged at a subsequent time.
A few years after Martin, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend the
narrow exception to the general rule set forth in Lynn's Food.198 In
Bodle, 199 the Fifth Circuit considered whether a general waiver of claims
resulting from a non-FLSA action between employees and employer
could bar subsequent FLSA claims. 200 The district court enforced the
release relying on the reasoning of Martin, but the Fifth Circuit reversed,
and, in doing so, declined to extend the rule of Martin.20 1 The Bodle
court reasoned that the release was obtained as part of a settlement of a
previous state court claim involving a covenant not to compete.20 2 This
claim did not involve unpaid wages, and because the court was not
"assured under these facts that the release resulted from a bona fide
dispute regarding overtime wages," it declined to enforce the release

195.

Dean J. Schaner & A. John Harper H, Employment Law, 45 TEx. TECH L. REV. 727, 766-

67(2013).
196.
197.

See Martin, 688 F.3d 247, 254 n.6; see also infra Section N.C.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

198.
199.

Bodle v. TXL Mortg. Corp., 788 F.3d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 161.

200.
201.

Id.
Id.

202. Id. at 164.
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against claims arising under the FLSA.2 °3
In deciding this issue, the Bodle v. TXL Mortg. Corp. court clarified
that the ruling in Martin carved out a narrow exception to the general
rule that FLSA settlement agreements for back wages must be
supervised by a court or the DOL.2 °4 The Fifth Circuit reinforced the
key component of this exception's applicability, viz., that there is
sufficient evidence of a "bona fide" dispute. 0 5 The exception did not
apply in Bodle, because there was no evidence presented that, prior to
entering into the general release in the state court action, the parties
discussed overtime compensation, nor was there a factual determination
at that time about the number of hours of unpaid overtime due.20 6 Thus,
the court reasoned, there is no evidence that there was a bona fide
dispute over overtime wages, and the "general prohibition against FLSA
waivers" did apply to bar the enforcement of the general release against
the FLSA claims.20 7 The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Bodle more precisely
defined the narrow circumstances of the Martin exception, and the
contours of a bona fide dispute.
B. The Second Circuit'sRejection of the Martin Exception
In the years that followed the Martin case, many innovative
attorneys in other circuits attempted to rely on its reasoning to persuade
district courts that bona fide FLSA disputes for back wages do not
require judicial supervision. Some district courts rejected the Martin
rule. 20 8 Yet other district courts concurred with the Martin rule. 20 9 The

203. Id. at 161.
204. Id. at 165.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208.. Grahovic v. Ben's Richardson Pizza Inc., No. 4:15CV01659 NCC, 2016 WL 1170977; at
*1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 25, 2016) (stating the common practice in the Eastern District of Missouri)
("[B]ecause declining to review the proposed settlement agreement would leave the Parties in an
uncertain position, the Court ...[did] review the settlement's FLSA-related terms for fairness.");
Steele v. Staffmark Investments, LLC, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1026 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) ("[Biased on
the unique purpose of the FLSA and the unequal bargaining power between employees and
employers, this Court finds that FLSA settlements require approval by either the Department of
Labor or a court."); Kraus v. PA Fit II, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 528 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("[T]his
Court rejects the Martin standard in favor of Lynn 's Food .. ");Bettger v. Crossmark, Inc., No.
1:13-CV-2030, 2015 WL 279754, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2015) ("Although the Third Circuit has
not addressed whether such § 216(b) actions claiming unpaid wages may be settled privately
without first obtaining court approval, district courts within the Third Circuit have followed the
majority position and assumed that judicial approval is necessary."); Archer v. TNT USA, Inc., 12
F. Supp. 3d 373, 386-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (discussing Martin and finding that even under its
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court 210 to
expressly consider the question of whether the Martin rule applies, and it
declined to follow the rule, siding instead with the traditional
2 11 In reaching
supervisory requirements of Lynn's Food.
its resolution,
the Second Circuit widened the existing circuit split, siding with the
Eleventh Circuit instead of the Fifth. Despite this split, the U.S.
2 12
Supreme Court has twice denied certiorari on this issue.
The precise issue before the Cheeks court was whether parties are
permitted to consent to a stipulated dismissal of a FLSA back wages
claim under FRCP 41(a)(l)(A)(ii), that is, whether the FLSA is an
"applicable federal statute" within the meaning of the rule.213 The
interrelated issue raised by Cheeks was "whether parties may settle
FLSA claims with prejudice, without court approval or DOL
supervision .... 2 14 In Cheeks, the district court held, and the Second
Circuit affirmed, that parties must have approval of either a court or the
DOL to settle FLSA claims for back wages, and thus are not permitted to
enter into a stipulated dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) because the

standards, the settlement agreement in this case was not approvable, and thus not deciding per se
whether it applies); Peralta v. Soundview at Glen Cove, Inc., No. 11 -CV-0867 (JS) (AKT), 2013
WL 2147792, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2013) (finding the reasoning of Martin not applicable to this
case); Files v. Federated Payment Sys. USA, Inc., No. 11-CV-3437 (JS)(GRB), 2013 WL 1874602,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2013) (refusing to find that judicial approval of FLSA settlement agreement
is not required).
209. Schneider v. Habitat for Humanity Int'l, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-5230, 2015 WL 500835, at *3
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 5, 2015) ("[T]his Court believes that the risk is minimal that an unreasonable
settlement will result from 'unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee' in FLSA
lawsuits where [certain] criteria is met .... ); Sarceno v. Choi, 66 F. Supp. 3d 157, 170 (D.D.C.
2014) ("The Court concurs with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Martin that a private settlement
of FLSA claims may be enforceable, even if the settlement was reached without United States
Department of Labor or judicial supervision or approval, but only when the agreement resolves a
bona fide dispute between the parties and the terms of the settlement are fair and reasonable.");
Duprey v. Scotts Co. LLC, 30 F. Supp. 3d 404, 410-11 (D. Md. 2014) (citing Martin approvingly);
Fernandez v. A-1 Duran Roofing, Inc., No. 12-CV-20757, 2013 WL 684736, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
25, 2013) (finding approval of the settlement agreement unnecessary); Picemi v. Bilingual Seit &
Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (having been virtually overruled by
Cheeks).
210. As of this writing, the Second Circuit is the only circuit court to expressly consider the
applicability of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Martin.
211. See Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 824 (2016).
212. Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 795 (2012); see also Cheeks, 136 S. Ct. at 824.
213. Cheeks, 796 F.3d at 204.
214. Id. at 201, 204 ('The question before us, however, asks whether the parties can enter into
a private stipulated dismissal of FLSA claims with prejudice, without the involvement of the district
court or DOL, that may later be enforceable.").
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FLSA is not an "applicable federal statute" within the meaning of the
rule.21 5 The Cheeks court exhaustively analyzed the case law on the
issue of court supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for back
wages and although recognizing the differing policy interests, including
the consideration that "the vast majority of FLSA cases.., are simply
too small, and the employer's finances too marginal, to have the parties
216
take further action if the Court is not satisfied with the settlement.,
Although sympathizing with this salient concern, the Second Circuit
determined that this concern "must be balanced against the FLSA's
primary remedial purpose: to prevent abuses by unscrupulous
employers, and remedy the disparate bargaining power between
employers and employees. ' 21 7
Accordingly, the Second Circuit
concluded by requiring the judicial or DOL supervision of FLSA
settlement agreements for back wages.21 8
The Cheeks decision, like Lynn's Food before it, gave significant
credence to the policies underlying the FLSA in coming to its decision
that effectively bans private settlements of bona fide disputes for back
wages without the supervision of the courts or DOL. The Cheeks court
emphasized the importance of protecting vulnerable employees from
substandard wages, and found that this policy supersedes other relevant
considerations.21 9 While not addressing specifically the interests of
party autonomy and freedom of contract, the primacy nevertheless lies
with the remedial purposes of the FLSA. 220 The Cheeks court's
decision, however, flies in the face of a corresponding policy identified
by the Supreme Court seventy years prior, namely, the "uniformity in
the application of the provisions of the Act. 221 The Second Circuit
solidified a split in the circuits through its explicit rejection of the Martin
rule, which the Fifth Circuit previously described merely as an exception
to the supervisory requirements. Thus, while attempting to promote the
policy of employee protection, the Second Circuit simultaneously
undermined the policy of uniform application.

215.
216.

Idat201.
Id. at 205 (omissions in original) (quoting Picemi v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925

F. Supp. 2d 368, 377 (E.D.N.Y.2013)).

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at206-07.
Id.at207.
Id.at 202.
Id.at 206.
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
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C. The Progeny of Cheeks
The Cheeks decision had immediate repercussions both within and
outside of the Second Circuit.y For example, on January 11, 2016, the
same day that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Cheeks, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, a court sitting in the Third Circuit, signed an
order requiring the judicial approval of FLSA settlement agreements.223
Beyond solidifying a circuit court split and the resulting reaction by
district courts, Cheeks also led to new issues relating to: (1) the impact
of Cheeks on offers of judgment arising under FRCP 68; and the
revitalization of older issues post-Cheeks relating to; (2) the factors to be
employed when deciphering a fair and reasonable FLSA settlement.
1. The Impact of Cheeks on Offers of Judgment
The month after the Second Circuit decided Cheeks, Judge
Cogan,224 whose opinion in Picerni was expressly overruled in Cheeks,
responded to the ruling. Judge Cogan distinguished FRCP 41 stipulated
dismissals from FRCP 68 offers of judgment and concluded that Cheeks
does not apply to FRCP 68 offers of judgment. 225 In Barnhill, the
plaintiffs filed a "Notice of Acceptance" of a FRCP 68 offer of judgment
which indicated they accepted the defendant's offer to provide them full
compensation for their FLSA claims.226 Without scrutinizing the
227
settlement, Judge Cogan ordered the clerk to enter the judgment.
Cogan reasoned that FRCP 68 offers of judgment should be treated
differently than FRCP 41 stipulated dismissals because: (1) FRCP 68
222. Westlaw's "Citing Resources" feature shows that Cheeks has been cited 189 times by
District Courts sitting in Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Of these 189 citations, 167 of them are
from New York ("Citation Resources" search conducted on October 20, 2017).
223.

Kraus v. PA Fit II, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 516, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2016).

224. Sitting on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
225. Barnhill v. Fred Stark Estate, No. 15 Civ. 3360(BMC), 2015 WL 5680145, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015).
226. This notice stated that defendants shall
pay to Plaintiffs the sum of sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00), representing
full payment for all the Plaintiffs claims, including but not limited to their
claims for lost income, unpaid wages, liquidated damages, penalties, and
interest, and inclusive of all reasonable costs and fees (such as attorneys'
fees) incurred up to the date of this offer of judgment. The Plaintiffs may
divide this sum as they see fit. If they cannot agree, the sum is to be divided
equally among the Plaintiffs.
Id.
227. Id. at *3.
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does not defer to "any applicable federal statute" but "subject to its
stated qualifications, permits dismissal for any or no reason"; 228 (2)
FRCP 68 requires an entry of a judgment by the clerk of the court; (3)
the policy considerations underpinning the FLSA cannot be taken too far
as all federal statutes have legitimate policies underlying them and a
judicial ranking of the importance of these policies would be an
overreaching of judicial powers; (4) there are a large number of FLSA
cases filed each year; and (5) FRCP 68 judgments are matters of public
record, so secret settlements will be impossible in this context.229
Through this rationale, Judge Cogan has allowed the utilization of a
different procedural mechanism for the dismissal of FLSA cases without
judicial scrutiny, thereby side-stepping the decision in Cheeks.
Barnhill led to a split of opinions within the Second Circuit, with
some judges sitting on district courts in the second circuit agreeing that
FRCP 68 judgments do not need judicial scrutiny 23 ° and yet others
contending that they do need scrutiny.2 31 Those who contend FRCP 68

judgments need supervision for fairness and reasonableness surmise that
concluding otherwise would undermine the overarching policy of
protecting vulnerable workers by creating a canyon-sized exception to
the requirement of judicial supervision that unscrupulous employers
could leverage to their advantage.232 These judges reason that there are
narrow exceptions to the mandatory nature of entering FRCP 68 offers
of judgment, including supervisory requirements over class actions,
bankruptcy claims, qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, and

228. Id. at*1.
229. Id. at*1-3.
230. See, e.g., Anwar v. Stephens, No. 15-CV-4493(JS)(GRB), 2017 WL 455416, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2017); Arzeno v. Big B World, Inc., 317 F.R.D. 440, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
Khereed v. W. 12th St. Rest., 317 F.R.D. 441, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Pest v. Express Contracting
Corp. of Great Neck, 219 F. Supp. 3d 360, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); cf Sagardia v. AD Delivery &
Warehousing, Inc., No. 15-CV-677 (CBA) (RLM), 2016 WL 4005777, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 25,
2016) (assuming Cheeks applies to Rule 68 offers of judgment).
231. See Lopez v. Overtime 1st Ave. Corp., 252 F. Supp. 3d 268, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Mei
Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 319 F.R.D. 111, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Sanchez v. Burgers &
Cupcakes LLC, No. 16-CV-3862 (VEC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38292, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2017); Toar v. Sushi Nomado of Manhattan, Inc., No. 13-CV-1901 (VSB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55162, at *18-20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,2017); Cantoran v. DDJ Corp., No. 15-CV-10041 (PAE), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79353, at *1.-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016); Walker v. Vital Recovery Servs., Inc.,
300 F.R.D. 599, 602 (N.D. Ga. 2014); Norman v. Alorica, Inc., No. 11-00433-KD-C, 2012 WL
5452196, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2012); Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1246-47
(M.D. Fla. 2010); Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Se.), Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2000-JEC, 2008 WL
754452, at *12-13 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2008).
1.
232. See cases cited supra note 231; see also supra Section III.C.
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others. 3 This question was recently submitted to the Second Circuit via
interlocutory appeal.
Regardless of how the Second Circuit decides
this appeal, similar questions will inevitably arise regarding the scope
and extent 235
of judicial supervisory requirements of FLSA settlement
agreements.
2. The Factors for a Fair and Reasonable Settlement
Cheeks, like Lynn's Food before it, mandated the judicial
supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages, but
similarly did not endorse a framework for district courts to follow when
making determinations about whether settlement agreements are fair and
reasonable. This has led to considerable uncertainty within the Second
Circuit given the lack of clear standards and guidance for what
constitutes a fair and reasonable settlement. As a result, practitioners are
left with a significant degree of doubt as to boundaries of reasonableness
even in a post-Cheeks environment.236 Although some district courts in
the second circuit have embraced the Wolinsky factors as part of a
"totality of the circumstances" test, the second circuit has yet to
explicitly endorse these factors. 7 Given the array of tests utilized by
district courts across the nation,238 the decision in Cheeks compounds the
level of uncertainty and diminishing predictability of the potential for
judicial enforcement of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages.
The lack of clear guidance in this area has consequent practical
implications for counsel who desire approval of FLSA settlement
agreements. At times, counsel in FLSA cases are required to submit
multiple motions or stipulations to a court in order to have a settlement
approved, even if both parties, and all counsel, agree it is fair and
reasonable, in order to convince a presiding judge to approve the
settlement.239 While the parties may want a lawsuit to end, the judicial
233. MeiXingYu, 319F.R.D. atll3-14.
234. Notice of Interlocutory Appeal at 1, Mei Xing Yu, 319 F.R.D. 111 (No. 16-CV-06094
(JMF)).
235. For example, in Cheeks, the Second Circuit declined to decide "whether parties may settle
such cases without court approval or DOL supervision by entering into a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)
stipulation without prejudice." Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 201 n.2 (2d.
Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 824, (2016).
236. See supra Section III.C.1.
237. Wolinsky v. Scholastic, 900 F. Supp. 2d 332, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
238. See discussion supra Section f.B.
239. See, e.g., Hughes v. Twp. of Franklin, No. 13-3761 (AMD), 2015 WL 9462965, at *2
(D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2015) (requiring, subsequent to this decision on summary judgment, multiple
motions for approval prior to the settlement agreement being approved).
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supervision of FLSA settlements for back wages may prevent parties
from concluding a litigation, extend the time and expense of it, and, at
times, even undermine the delicate negotiation process and the otherwise
desirable settlements reached between parties. Unexpected time and
costs arise when judges require settlement agreement revisions or
additional filings by attorneys subsequent to the initial request for the
approval of a settlement, and often these costs are not anticipated by the
initial fee amount agreed to via the settlement. 240 The rules of court, and
risks of additional costs, often deter practitioners from requesting
interlocutory appeals of the non-final orders denying such motions or
stipulations requesting approval of settlement agreements.24 1 In light of
these, and related, consequences of the judicial supervision of FLSA
settlement agreements for back wages, a new framework is needed to
resolve the increasingly complicated issues spurring from these
supervisory requirements.
IV. WHY THE SUPERVISORY REQUIREMENT Is NECESSARY

The necessity of the supervisory requirement of FLSA settlement
agreements for back wages is not immediately obvious, and it is
tempting to argue that FLSA settlement agreements for back wages
should not be supervised. Concerns for individual liberty and autonomy,
freedom of contract, and anti-paternalism immediately pour to the
forefront when considering governmental intrusion into the private
contractual affairs of its citizens.242 Indeed, throughout history, the
importance of preserving human liberty and autonomy are recurrently
stressed by philosophers, politicians, and jurists. In the eighteenth
century, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man ("French
Declaration") and the U.S. Declaration of Independence, both products
of enlightenment thought, emphasized individual liberty and mandated
the need for freedom from oppression.243 In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, presiding judges often gave primacy to client's

240.
241.

See infra Section I.C.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).

242.

See infra text accompanying notes 243-50.

243.

French Declarationof the Rights of Man art. 2, art. 4 (1789), reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS

AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 69, 69-70 (William -G. Andrews 2d. ed. 1963) [hereinafter French
Declarationof the Rights of Man] (stressing liberty and resistance to oppression in Article 2 and
stressing liberty and rights in Article 4); US. Declaration of Independence (1776), reprinted in

AMERICAN CONGRESS 523, 523 (Joseph West Moore 1895) (naming "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" as unalienable rights).
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control and autonomy over other worthwhile policies. 2 " In the twentieth
century, F. A. Hayek and others argued that governmental interference
245
with the private economic affairs of its citizens disrupts the economy.
Individual autonomy and liberty have recurrently been identified as
paramount moral rights throughout the modem era.
Although liberty and autonomy require that individuals be
permitted to contract in the private marketplace as they see fit, these
rights do not provide a blank moral check to do anything one desires.
To the contrary, one widely acknowledged limitation to individual
liberty is John Stuart Mill's "harm principle," an early variation of which
is encapsulated in Article 4 of the French Declaration, which provides
that "Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does not injure
others. 2 46 As stated more precisely by Mill, "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 24 7 The
supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages is intended
to prevent harm to vulnerable employees who may be taken advantage
of by their employers. The DOL supervision of settlement agreements is
similarly intended to prevent employers from exploiting employees.24 8
The FLSA itself was promulgated to ensure this aim is accomplished,
and that employees in the U.S. are protected from potential harm on a
broad basis. 249 Accordingly, insofar as the supervision of FLSA
settlement agreements for back wages is viably preventing harm to the
working classes, it places a legitimate restraint upon the liberty and
autonomy of contractors.
Aside from the central concern for paternalistic interference with
individual liberty and autonomy, there are at least four other reasons
why one might oppose the supervision of FLSA settlement agreements:
244.

JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: THE RISE, FALL, AND FuTURE 20

(2015) ("Even if the client were breaching the fee agreement, public policy required that the client
remain in control (and in any event settlements of disputes were favored)."); see Spaulding v.
Beidleman, 160 P. 1120, 1123 (Okla. 1916); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905),
abrogatedby W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor
to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 243-48 (1998).
245. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 230 (1944); see also Keith William
Diener, The Road to Discrimination: Implications of the Thought of F. A. Hayek for Equal
Employment Law, 14 ALSB J. EMP. &LAB. L. 30, 31 (2013).
246. FrenchDeclarationof the Rights of Man, supra note 243, at 69; JOHN STUART MILL, ON

LIBERTY 68 (Penguin ed., 1974) (1859).
247.
248.

MILL, supra note 246, at 68.
See 28 U.S.C. § 216 (2012).

249.

See 29 U.S.C. §202 (2012).
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(1) the policies that were utilized to develop the supervisory requirement
are not found in the express language of the FLSA; (2) supervising
FLSA settlement agreements for back wages, but not all types of
settlement agreements, represents a judicial prioritization of FLSA rights
over others; (3) the increasing FLSA case load is creating a significant
burden on the courts that are tasked with supervising the agreements (as
well as the attorneys who are subject to supeivision); and (4) in many
cases, FLSA agreements are routinely approved by presiding judges, and
not seriously scrutinized. 2 0 These considerations are considered and
weighed in the following paragraphs.
A. The Policies Underlying the FLSA are Not in the Act
The four policies set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brooklyn
Savings Bank, that were relied upon by the Lynn's Food court when
mandating the judicial supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for
back wages, have been criticized because they were not expressly stated
in the FLSA. This critique is explained in Judge Rifkind's district court
opinion in Gangi which held that when FLSA coverage is a genuine
issue, an employer could agree to pay overtime compensation, but not
liquidated damages, by utilizing the mechanisms of an accord and
satisfaction.25 1 Judge Rifkind reasoned that:
[T]here is no conflict between the public policy of the
statute and the equally well-established policy of the law
to encourage the amicable adjustment of disputes by
arms' length negotiation. I find nothing in the statute
which prohibits the settlement of such a past-due claim,
especially if the amount paid in settlement is at least
equal to the unpaid over-time compensation.252

250. See infra Section IV.A-D.
251. Gangi v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 844, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd, 150 F.2d 694
(2d Cir. 1945), aft'd, 328 U.S. 108 (1946). However, the criticism that these policies are not
expressly in the statute preceded Judge Rifkind's opinion, as declared previously in the dissenting
opinion of Justices Stone, Roberts, and Frankfurter in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. 0 'Neil. 324 U.S.
697, 718 (1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) ("If such an undeclared policy is to be inferred, it must be
inferred from the statute, read in its appropriate setting.").
252. Gangi, 53 F. Supp. at 846. ("The parties had a genuine dispute and having settled it, the
plaintiffs repudiate the settlement, but tenaciously hold on to the benefits received. If they win, they
will collect the liquidated damages. If they lose, they, nevertheless, retain the over-time
compensation to which they are not entitled. I do not believe that it is the intention of the statute to
drive so wide a breach between law and morals.")
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Judge Rifkind's opinion was overruled by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, which reasoned that the policies set forth in Brooklyn
Savings Bank, and the deterrent effect of the liquidated damages clause,
would be undermined if an accord and satisfaction could be utilized to
release an employer from, the liquidated damages requirement.2 53
Finally, upon certiorari, the employer argued that "the congressional
intent to forbid compromises of such claims is not clear" and so
departing from the longstanding policy of encouraging the settlement of
disputes should not be inferred to promote policies that are not clearly
stated in the FLSA.254 The majority of the Supreme Court rejected this
argument by referencing the same policies from Brooklyn Savings Bank,
and particularly mentioning that "the free flow of commerce requires
that reparations to restore damage done by such failure to pay on time
must be made" and that "inequality of bargaining power" between
employers and vulnerable employees requires the court to forbid such
waivers. 255
Although the majority did reject the employer's argument, Justice
Frankfurter, with whom Justice Burton concurred, dissented to the
opinion, clearly articulating that they believed the reasons stated 25in6
Judge Rifkind's district court opinion to be substantially correct.
Moreover, in response to the employer's claims that the policies were
unclear, the dissenting judges stated that these polices were "like
nitrogen" pulled from thin "air" and that before a "familiar and socially
desirable practice is outlawed, where overreaching or exploitation is not
inherent in the situation, the outlawry should come from Congress. To
that end, some responsibility at least for a broad hint to the courts, if not
for explicitness, should be left with Congress. 2 57 The dissenting judges
contended that a clear statement from Congress should be issued before
a longstanding policy, such as encouraging the settlement of disputes,
should be overturned.25 8 The crux of these arguments is that it is not the
judiciary's role to devise policies underlying legislation, but it is
Congress's role to instruct the courts as to which policies underlie its
legislation.2 5 9 Thus, when the Eleventh Circuit referred back to these

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Gangi, 150 F.2d at 695-696.
Gangi, 328 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 115 (quoting Brooklyn Say. Bank, 324 U.S. at 708).
Id.at 121.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 122.
Id.
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policies, when mandating the judicial supervision of FLSA settlement
agreements for back wages, it relied on policies that were at-best,
unclear, and at-worst, imaginary.26 °
This central debate regarding the validity of the implementation of
judicially construed policies as a basis for deciding cases is
longstanding. 261 Nevertheless, in the over seventy years since the
Brooklyn Savings Bank decision, these same policies have become so
engrained in the FLSA case law that challenging them today would
prove a significant task. Insofar as these policies are now broadly
accepted, it provides support for the assessment that "in a democracy, if
enough people believe something, then it is true. 262 Moreover, the
manner by which the common law developed is widely reflected in the
reiteration of these policies over the decades that followed their
enunciation by the Supreme Court.
A close look at the four policies themselves, although not all
explicitly stated in the FLSA, do represent the court's attempt to ensure
the intent of Congress is attained. The four policies are: (1) protecting
vulnerable employees; (2) ensuring the minimum standard of living for
workers within the free flow of commerce; (3) ensuring that rights
conferred to private parties, but impacting the public interest, are not
waived; and (4) promoting the uniform application of the FLSA. 263 The
Brooklyn Savings Bank court identified each of these policies by
references to case law, legislative history, and/or the FLSA itself.264 The
policies were not pulled solely from "air" but rather from an intricate
analysis of the resources that were available to the judiciary at the time.
The first two policies can be gleaned from the FLSA itself, specifically,
29 U.S.C. § 202, which is cited by the Supreme Court in its opinion (and
are further supported by FLSA legislative history). 265 The second two
policies arise from legislative history and case law.266 It is not unclear
that these policies exist, but rather it is unclear how they apply to
specific circumstances, such as the waiver of liquidated damages,
agreements regarding coverage, and the supervision of settlement
agreements for back wages. The policies themselves are today rarely
260. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).
261. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); see also Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 69 (1905) abrogatedby W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
262. John Hasnas, Trump is Democracy Personified, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., (Feb. 24,
2017), https://fee.org/articles/donald-trump-is-democracy-personified/.
263. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-10 (1945).
264. Id. at 704-10.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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questioned, although
controversial.

in their early

days,

were

challenged

as

B. The Judiciaryis Prioritizingthe Importance of FLSA Rights
A more potent critique, one that has been recently reiterated in the
New York district courts in a post-Cheeks environment, similarly relates
to judicial priorities.
Namely, that requiring FLSA settlement
agreements to be supervised, but not other types of settlement
agreements to be supervised, amounts to a judicial prioritization of the
importance of FLSA rights over others. As district court Judge Cogan
argues:
[T]he statute was enacted to protect against "the evil of
overwork" without statutorily required compensation.
But surely, that evil is no greater than a case where a
police officer gratuitously beats a suspect (42 U.S.C. §
1983), or a debt collector threatens children that their
father will be imprisoned if he does not pay his bill (Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act), or a consumer's credit is
ruined because of a falsely reported debt (Fair Credit
Reporting Act), or an employee is forced to submit to
unwanted sexual advances or face termination (Title
VII). These, and many others, are federal cases for a
reason. They are all important, and the statutes and
constitutional provisions under which they arise all
protect unique interests based on unique policy
considerations. For the courts to begin ranking the
wrongs addressed by Congress where Congress has not
would be to assume a legislative role.267
Judge Cogan's point that there are many evils in this world, some
of which federal legislation is designed to -prevent, is well-taken.
Although well-taken, his argument is based on the assumption that
supervising FLSA settlement agreements is performed because FLSA
rights are ranked by judges as more important than the policies
embedded in other statutes. 268 To the contrary, when Congress has

267. Barnhill v. Fred Stark Estate, No. 15 Civ. 3360(BMC), 2015 WL 5680145, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015) (select internal citations omitted).
268.

Seeid.
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enlisted private citizens to engage in the preservation of public rights,
such as the preservation of overtime and minimum wage rights, there
must be mechanisms in place to ensure that those whom Congress enlists
do not game the system. 269 The need for oversight is analogous to
giving an office manager complete control over a business's bank
accounts, payroll, and lines of credits without occasionally auditing the
manager's work. The tendency of some, if unaudited, would inevitably
be to manage the accounts in their own interests instead of in the
interests of the business for which they were hired to account. Others
may even go so far as to steal, embezzle, or cheat the business which
they were hired to run. Without the occasional check on those appointed
in trust, significant damage could be done to those who should be
protected.
The FLSA is inherently paternalistic. It limits the freedom of
contract of employers and employees to minimum requirements, and
forbids individuals from agreeing to less than the statutory entitlements,
even if individuals desire to work for less than minimum wage so as to
give themselves a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 270 When
mandating certain requirements that infringe liberty, there is
considerable concern that some will attempt to skirt these requirements
in the name of promoting individual liberty. Nevertheless, mandated
supervision is deemed necessary not only in FLSA contexts but also in
other contexts including: class actions, bankruptcy claims, qui tam
actions under the False Claims Act, and, in some jurisdictions, the
settlement of actions "commenced by or on behalf of a minor., 271 There
2 72
are also supervisory mechanisms over shareholder derivative suits.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century arguments that
individual liberty and freedom of contract reign supreme have. largely
been repudiated.2 73 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized,

269. COFFEE, supra note 244, at 174-235 (utilizing the concepts of.the "private attorney
general" and the "semiprivate attorney general" to represent those private or semiprivate individuals
who enforce public rights); see also FARHANG, supra note 59, at 8-9 (2010) (discussing the private
citizen's role as an enforcer of public policies, including those of the FLSA, and noting that
"[p]rivate litigants and their attorneys represent a core dimension of the American regulatory state's
infrastructural power").
270. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
271. Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 319 F.R.D. 111, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
272. See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate
Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2, 13, 15, 22 (1999).

273. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 49, 53 (1905) abrogatedby W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937).
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[F]reedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute,
right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or
to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does
not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide
department of activity which consists of the making of
contracts, or deny to government the power to provide
restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of
arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of
the community. 274
Such notions have proceeded through the twentieth and twenty-first
century to justify the inherent paternalism of laws such as the FLSA.
The contemporary legal landscape provides additional reason for
supervisory requirements. One commentator, John Coffee, identifies
five shortcomings of "entrepreneurial litigation" (which includes
plaintiffs FLSA work): overzealousness, disloyalty and collusion,
overaggregation, lack of political accountability, and symbolic justice. 275
Such concerns for entrepreneurial litigation pervade the bar, and the
migration of plaintiff's attorneys towards FLSA practice, along with the
rise in incidents of FLSA claims, is a documented phenomenon that
should urge even greater caution. 276
In sum, albeit there are
unquestionably a variety of important policy objectives that federal
legislation is designed to attain, the unique confluence of factors that
combine to form the current FLSA landscape require the judicial
supervision of FLSA settlement agreements in order to ensure, not the
priority of FLSA rights over others, but instead, the minimum adherence
to the rights afforded by the statute by those who are entrusted to enforce
it. There is just no other practical mechanism currently available for
ensuring that these rights are not derogated.
C. The IncreasingFLSA Case Load is Creating a Burden
The process for dismissing a pending litigation due to a settlement
varies by jurisdiction,, but in most cases of settlement of claims,
dismissing the case is a routine matter. Once a settlement is properly
reached, little time and effort are required for attorneys and courts to
274.

W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 392 (quoting Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.

McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 565 (1911)).
275.
276.

COFFEE, supranote 244, at 220-27.
Charlotte Alexander, LitigationMigrants (Working Paper) (on file with author).
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dismiss any pending litigation associated with the settled case. In
shorthand, it is generally merely a matter of paperwork. In the case of
FLSA settlement agreements for back wages, and certain other legal
claims, judges are required to scrutinize the settlement agreements prior
to approving the settlements.2 7' The time that is required for a judge to
meticulously examine every provision of a settlement agreement
particularly in jurisdictions that have high FLSA filings, may indeed be
considerable. 278 The murkiness of the current FLSA landscape, and the
amorphous standards that are proffered by courts to guide the attorneys
drafting the settlement agreements (e.g. "fair" and "reasonable") often
result in courts rejecting motions to approve the agreements simply
because the attorneys do not employ the correct standards in their
motions for approval or have not convinced the court that the relevant
agreement should be approved. 27 9 This too can result in delays of
several months, if not longer, before a settlement is finally approved (if
it is approved at all).280 As a result, there are more than an
inconsiderable amount of cases involving courts, at least initially,
refusing to approve FLSA settlement agreements, and requesting more
information or support for the agreement by the settling attorneys,
which, in turn, delays the approval of the settlement, and places a burden
on both courts and practitioners (as well as those employees eagerly
awaiting their long overdue back wages).28 1

277. Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 319 F.R.D. 111, 112-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); cf Gormin
v. Brown-Forman Corp., 963 F.2d 323, 325-27 (11 th Cir. 1992) (holding that settlements of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act issues do not require judicial supervision).
278. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, supra note 59 (tracing the increase in FLSA filings); see also
Alexander, supra note 276 (identifying an approximately 400% increase of FLSA filings by private
plaintiffs in federal courts between the years 2000 and 2016).
279. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Joseph Cory Holdings, LLC, No. 6:16-cv-1307-Orl-40TBS, 2017
WL 2881533, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2017) (rejecting motion to approve); Shepheard v. Aramark
Unif. & Career Apparel, LLC, No. 15-7823-DDC-GEB, 2016 WL 5817074, at *1, *4 (D. Kan. Oct.
5, 2016) (denying motion to approve); Lewkowicz v. F&J's Caffe Italia, LLC, No. 8:16-cv-242CEH-TGW, 2016 WL 3438750, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2016) (denying the motion to approve);
McGee v. Family Dollar Stores of Fla., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-14370-ROSENBERG/LYNCH, 2016 WL
687622, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2016) (rejecting, initially, motion to approve); McKeen-Chaplin
v. Franklin Am. Mortg. Co., No. C 10-5243 SBA, 2012 WL 6629608, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19,
2012) (denying motion to approve); Khanna v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., No. CIV S-09-2214 KJM
GGH, 2012 WL 4465558, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) (denying motion to approve); Parrilla v.
Allcom Constr. & Installation Serv., LLC, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1352 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Soto v.
Kechejian, LLC, No. 6:09-cv-949-Orl-22DAB, 2010 WL 258783, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2010)
(rejecting the initial motion to approve).
280. See cases cited supra note 279.
281. See cases cited supra note 279.
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D. FLSA Settlement Agreements are Routinely Approved Without
Scrutiny
The burden being created by FLSA settlement agreement
supervision is resulting in some courts merely "rubber stamping"
agreements, instead of going through the arduous process of scrutinizing
every provision of a FLSA settlement agreement. The burden has led to
both attorneys and judges developing creative methods for
circumventing the supervisory requirement, such as the use of stipulated
dismissals 28 2 or offers of judgment. 283 Aside from the burden that
rejecting a settlement agreement creates, there may be other motivations
involved in "rubber stamping" the settlement agreements. These may
include the realization that the practical implications of rejecting an
agreement mandates further work by the court, and possibly even trial.
The political or social associations of members of the bar may also play
a role in these decisions. All of these factors may combine to lead some
judges to merely approve these agreements as a matter of course, and
without serious scrutiny.
Although at times the approval of FLSA settlement agreements for
back wages may be burdensome, these occasional burdens upon the
court, practitioners, and parties are outweighed by utilitarian concerns
for promoting the greater good by ensuring that the basic subsistence
rights and basic minimum wage needs of all societal members are not
undermined.2 84 The burden on practitioners (and possibly courts) can be
eased by providing clear criteria regarding what should be incorporated
into FLSA back wages settlement agreements. The next section begins a
sketch of how this system may be streamlined, and makes suggestions
for how clearer guidance can be provided to practitioners.
V. A

REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT THE CONTRACT ACCORDS

WITH PUBLIC POLICY
Although district courts across the United States have employed a
variety of approaches to analyzing the fairness and reasonableness of

282. Picemi v. Bilingual Seit & Preschool Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 368, 369, 378 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).

283.

Barnhill v. Fred Stark Estate, No. 15 Civ. 3360(BMC), 2015 WL 5680145, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015).

284. 'Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) ("[A] Congressional recognition
that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the
minimum standard of living 'necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers'.").
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FLSA settlement agreements for back wages, little scholarly work has
been produced on this topic to-date. In this section, this article outlines a
model for analyzing FLSA settlement agreements for back wages. It
suggests, first, that courts abandon the language of Lynn's Food
pertaining to "reasonableness" and "fairness." It then provides five
prerequisites of a FLSA settlement agreement for back wages, which, if
met, should give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the agreement
accords with the public policies underpinning the FLSA. Third, it
discusses the circumstances by which the presumption may be rebutted,
and then what happens when the presumption is not met, and, finally, the
benefits and burdens of this new framework. This section is followed by
a brief conclusion.
Both "reasonableness" and "fairness" are amorphous concepts that
exist on spectrums. Both provide for a limited range of circumstances
that fall within their spectrums as displayed in Figure I. The exact
contours of the spectrums are dubious but there are unquestionably
certain things that are "fair" or "reasonable" and other things that are
not. If falling within a permissible range of actions (or, in the case of
contracts, "terms"), then the actions or terms fall within the spectrum of
things that are considered reasonable or fair. Yet, certain other actions
or terms do fall outside of this spectrum, and, if extending too far from
the center, become unfair or unreasonable. The ranges existing between
the two lines in Figure I represent the ranges of possible terms that may
be considered fair and reasonable, and the ranges extending on either
side of the two lines represent those things that are not. While there is a
theoretical center for both fairness and reasonableness, there is some
room for leeway, that is, to extend away from the center towards the
lines, but once those lines are crossed, something becomes unfair or
unreasonable. The exact location and contours of the lines themselves
are unquestionably controversial.
Figure 1:
--

Unreasonable

I-

I
Reasonable
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The task, under Lynn 's Food, is for a court to identify those
contractual terms that would presumptively place a FLSA settlement
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agreement between the two lines of fairness and reasonableness, without
extending too far outwards so as to become unfair or unreasonable
terms. This framework of analyzing what is "fair and reasonable" has
led to at least three major approaches to deciphering fair and reasonable
settlement agreements within the district courts: the totality of the
circumstances approach, the multi-factored approach, and the relevant
circumstances approach to deciphering if a contract is fair and
reasonable.2 85 First, these different approaches have led to disharmony
in the application of the FLSA.286 Second, "fair and reasonable" has
become a fused concept within most FLSA settlement agreement
analyses, with courts giving little consideration to the differences
between what is "fair" and what is "reasonable," but treating them as
one and the same (presuming that what is fair is reasonable and viceversa).28 7 Third, the amorphous nature of these terms do not give
specific guidance to district court judges who are tasked with approving
these settlement agreements.288 Such guidance is also lacking for
practitioners who negotiate FLSA settlement agreements. Fourth, the
"fair and reasonable" standards were judicially imposed by the Eleventh
Circuit and have neither a basis in statute nor in traditional common
law.289 To the contrary, traditional common law principles, as discussed
in Brooklyn Savings Bank, instruct judges to analyze FLSA settlement
agreements to decipher if they are void for violating public policy (and
not to analyze them for fairness or reasonableness).29 ° In sum, the "fair
and reasonable" language spurring from Lynn's Foodundermines certain
of the policies it was promulgated to preserve. Accordingly, this
language should be abandoned in favor of a framework that provides
improved guidance to practitioners and judges, better balances the
policies underpinning the FLSA, and accords with traditional Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
A. The Five Prerequisitesof the Presumption
This article proposes a burden-shifting framework that begins with

285.
286.
287.

See discussion supra Section f.B.
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section I.B.

288. See supra Section l.B.2.
289. See Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (1lth Cir. 1982).
290. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945) ("To allow contracts for waiver
of liquidated damages approximates situations where courts have uniformly held that contracts
tending to encourage violation of laws are void as contrary to public policy.").
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a simple showing by a party seeking approval of a FLSA settlement for
back wages that the FLSA settlement agreement is in accordance with
the public policies underpinning the FLSA. There are five prerequisites
to a primafacie showing that the agreement comports with public policy
which, when taken in tandem, create a framework less rigorous than that
of Lynn's Food, but more stringent than Martin. This "middle-way"
method of examining FLSA settlement agreements, if adopted, will
promote harmonization in the application of the FLSA provisions,
protect the vulnerable employee population, ensure that FLSA rights are
not abrogated, improve the predictability of the enforcement of FLSA
settlement agreements, and has the potential to reduce the time and
expense of post-settlement FLSA proceedings. In other words, it
ensures the policies identified in Brooklyn Savings Bank are fulfilled
while simultaneously balancing them against legitimate considerations
of FLSA legal practice. These five prerequisites to the presumption of
enforceability are derived from the case law and practice of courts which
began developing with Brooklyn Savings Bank. The five prerequisites of
this "middle way" method are explained in the following paragraphs. In
order for a FLSA settlement agreement for back wages to be presumed
to be in accordance with public policy, all of these considerations must
be satisfied. However, as discussed next, this presumption is rebuttable.
1. Employees Must be Given Full Compensation
In order for a FLSA settlement agreement for back wages to be
presumed to accord with public policy, the injured employee must
receive full compensation through the settlement agreement. In order to
decipher if full compensation is being paid, an initial determination
regarding the status of the case must be made by the presiding judge. A
FLSA case for back wages may be dissected into four types: an
undisputed case, a bona fide dispute, a non-bona fide dispute, and a
dispute over coverage. The measure for calculating "full compensation"
is different for bona fide disputes, than it is for undisputed cases and
non-bona fide disputes. In any case, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence dating back to the 1940s articulates unquestionably that
FLSA rights cannot be waived by contract, full compensation must be
provided to injured employees, and that full compensation includes back
pay and liquidated damages.2 9'
An undisputed case is one within which the employer and employee
291.

See discussion supra Section I.
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agree that back wages are owed, and they also agree as to ,the amount of
back wages owed. Such a case is quite likely to settle, and if it does, full
compensation must be paid to the injured employee. For undisputed
cases, full compensation is calculated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216. 2
That is, the employee is due the amount of back wages (unpaid overtime
and/or unpaid minimum wage) and an equal amount in liquidated
damages. 293 Thus, if an employee is owed $1000 for unpaid overtime,
that employee is entitled to another $1000 for liquidated damages, for a
total of $2000. The reasonable attorneys' fees and costs must be paid by
the employer above this amount, and not taken out of it.
In the case of a bona fide dispute, there is some legitimate (good
faith) dispute between the employer and employee regarding (i) whether
back wages are owed at all, or (ii) the amount of back wages owed.2 94
As in most cases that arrive in a courtroom, an employer does provide
some basis for not providing the requested monies to the injured
employee. If these reasons are legitimate and may, in fact, reduce the
amount of a judgment to the employee (e.g., disputes over rate of pay,
number of hours worked, or if the employee was already compensated
for certain work), then such reasons could give rise to a bona fide
dispute between the employer and employee. Even in the case of a bona
fide dispute, the injured employee is still entitled to full compensation,
but the measure of calculating full compensation for bona fide disputes
is different than for undisputed cases.295
Settlements of bona fide disputes conform to public policy when
such settlements fall into a range of potential settlements, somewhere
between the employee's best possible recovery and the employer's
lowest possible payout, if all cards were to, so to speak, fall in favor of
one or the other if the case were to be tried on its merits. Ironically, and
a fact that opens a wide door for employer compulsion, given the
inherent unpredictability of trials, in some cases, full compensation for
bona fide disputes could range anywhere from zero to one hundred
percent of the requested back wages and liquidated damages. This could
be the case if an employer were to have a defense that would alleviate it

292. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid
minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees ... ").
293. Id. ("The Secretary may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover
the amount of unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated
damages.").
294. See Brooklyn Sa. Bank, 324 U.S. at 703 n.12 ("[T]here was no discussion or dispute...
either as to the existence of liability under the Act or as to the amount of such liability.").
295.

See id. at 714.
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completely from any FLSA liability, such as if firefighters or police
were on a 28 day work period under 29 U.S.C. § 207(k), 296 and thus any
disputed hours were not due overtime payments.
Yet, in other cases, the range of full compensation for a bona fide
dispute is much smaller. For example, a case wherein the employee
claims she is owed overtime wages for one hundred hours of work, and
the employer claims the wages are only owed for eighty hours of work.
If the rate of pay in this example were $20.00 per hour, then full
compensation for the back wages would be somewhere between $1600
and $2000, plus liquidated damages in an equal amount (totaling $3200
to $4000). Thus, a settlement in the amount of $1000 for these injuries
would not provide full compensation, because it is below the employer's
lowest possible payout, but a settlement at $3200, or above, would
provide full compensation because it is at or above the employer's
lowest possible payout. In any case, an employee must be provided full
compensation. For bona fide disputes, full compensation will fall within
a case-specific range.29 7
Non-bona fide disputes also require full compensation, but, like the
undisputed cases, these claims require the employer to pay the employee
full compensation in the full amount owed. The category of non-bona
fide disputes purportedly includes cases wherein an employer makes bad
faith or illegitimate claims in a dishonest attempt to leverage a lower
settlement or judgment than an employee would otherwise merit. If a
judge makes the initial determination that a dispute is non-bona fide,
then nothing less than full compensation will be calculated as the
employee's best possible recovery (including liquidated damages),
which will suffice to avoid violating public policy. Alternatively, one
could have a trial on the merits.
As the Supreme Court held in Gangi, disputes over FLSA coverage
cannot be settled by private agreement without violating the public
policies embedded in the FLSA. Gangi held that private settlements that
resolve the issue of whether employees are covered by the FLSA violate
public policy. 298 However, if an employer desired to avoid continued
litigation when coverage is an issue, an employer could purportedly
concede FLSA coverage, and provide full compensation to the injured
296. See e.g., Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 2003) (involving dispute
over whether 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) exception applied); Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802,
805 (11th Cir. 1992).
297. See Lonny Hoffman & Christian J. Ward, The Limits of Comprehensive Peace: The
Example of the FLSA, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 265,303 (2017).
298. D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1946).
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employee without violating any public policies. Such a, case would be
better classified as an undisputed FLSA case, requiring full
compensation per 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
In sum, the first prerequisite of a presumption that a FLSA
settlement agreement for back wages accords with public policy is that
the employee is given full compensation for the back wages owed, and
such calculation of back wages should depend on the classification of
the case as: (1) an undisputed case; (2) a bona fide dispute; (3) a nonbona fide dispute; or (4) a dispute over coverage. In any case, however,
full compensation must be provided to the employee.
2. Employees Must Be Represented by Counsel
In order for a FLSA settlement agreement for back wages to be
presumed to be in accordance with public policy, for all types of claims
(whether bona fide or not), the injured employee must be represented by
counsel during the settlement of the claims. Although the Fifth Circuit's
ruling in Martin fell short of initiating a per se requirement of attorney
representation prior to deeming a settlement of a bona fide dispute for
back wages enforceable, the court did emphasize that the parties were
represented by counsel during settlement.299 Subsequent cases have
honed in on this language, signifying the importance of party
representation in bona fide disputes over FLSA back wages. 300 In order
to ensure that an injured employee does not unknowingly waive FLSA
rights, and is fully informed of the merits of a case, and the range of
possible recoveries, representation is required for the presumption to
come into effect. In other words, for a FLSA settlement for back wages
to be presumed to accord with public policy, the party seeking approval
must show the judge that the injured employee was represented by
counsel during settlement.30 1
While it is tempting to permit a waiver of this right, for any type of
claim and particularly an undisputed claim, a waiver would not
sufficiently protect the rights of the parties. Thus, for any type of FLSA
dispute over back wages, in order for the presumption to come into

299. Martin v. Spring Break '83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 2012).
300. The Second Circuit commented that the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Martin "cannot be read as
a wholesale rejection of Lynn's Food: it relies heavily on evidence that a bona fide dispute between
the parties existed, and that the employees who accepted the earlier settlement were represented by
counsel." Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 824 (2016).
301. Id. at 205-06.
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effect, there must be a showing of employee representation by counsel.
This does not mean that an agreement could not be enforced if an
employee is not represented by counsel, but only that the presumption
does not come into effect, and, if not represented by counsel, further
30 2
scrutiny of the agreement by the presiding judge is necessary.
Particularly in the case of a bona fide dispute, when there is a range of
potential recovery, party representation by competent counsel is
necessary because unrepresented parties would undeniably be
disadvantaged by proceeding through such negotiations without counsel
to advise the employee as to the range of possible recoveries, and
likelihood of success if such a case were tried on its merits. It is further
conceivable that a particularly vulnerable employee without counsel
(such as a migrant worker), even in an undisputed case, could be
hoodwinked by a sophisticated employer.
3. Attorneys' Fees and Costs Must Be Reasonable
Going hand-in-hand with the notions of full compensation and
employee representation by counsel, in all cases, the party seeking
approval of a FLSA settlement agreement must show that the attorneys'
fees and costs paid through settlement are reasonable, and that such
reasonable fees and costs are paid directly by the employer over and
303
above the full compensation to the employee, and not paid out of it.
Title 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides that for proceedings brought in court
to recover unpaid overtime or unpaid minimum wages, that the court
"shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs
of the action., 30 4 The statute is unambiguous that such fees and costs
shall (mandatorily) be paid "in addition to any judgment" and not out of
such a judgment. 30 5 For fee awards via settlement, so long as full
compensation is paid, attorneys should be permitted to negotiate any
reasonable fee that does not otherwise violate the pertinent rules of
professional conduct in the relevant jurisdiction.3 °6
Thus, the
reasonableness of fees in settlements should not be limited beyond those
that are permissible under the rules of professional conduct in the
relevant jurisdiction, so long as the employee is paid full compensation
302. See infra Section V.C.
303. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
304. Id.
305.
306.

Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (2009).
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for any back wages under the FLSA (including liquidated damages), and
307
fees are paid by the employer over and above such full compensation.
4. There Must Be No Confidentiality Provisions
The importance of making FLSA settlement agreements public, and
thus preventing their confidentiality, is a well-recognized prerequisite to
ensuring the public policies of the FLSA are not undercut. One
commentator, Elizabeth Wilkins, argues that allowing parties to maintain
the confidentiality of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages is
repugnant to and undermines the FLSA.3 °8 Wilkins is predominately
concerned with ensuring transparency in the FLSA settlement process,
so that unscrupulous employers cannot remove their misdeeds from the
public eye. Allowing confidential FLSA settlements, she argues, would
fly in the face of the quasi-public rights of the FLSA, promote the
potential for power imbalances produced by unequal worker-employer
bargaining, and are not sensible in light of the "actual dynamics" of
FLSA lawsuits "in today's economy" and particularly those barriers
faced by low wage workers who attempt to vindicate their rights.3 °9
Wilkins provides greater depth to the justifications for prohibiting broad
confidentiality provisions within FLSA contexts, a prohibition that is
generally accepted across the district courts.3 1°
Confidentiality provisions have been utilized in a variety of ways
within FLSA settlement negotiations. Although some courts have
allowed limited confidentiality provisions, such as promises not to
discuss the case with the press or media, or provisions that provide no
retaliatory mechanisms for the employer if violated, as a general rule, a
party seeking a presumption that a settlement agreement accords with
public policy must show that there is no confidentiality provision in the
FLSA settlement agreement for back wages. 3 11 Even if limited, or
crafted carefully to have no means of sanctioning violations,
confidentiality provisions have the potential to undercut the FLSA, and
307. Limitations on fees pursuant to the fee-shifting statute, if applied after the entry of a
judgment in the employee's favor, are in the discretion of the trial court. Agreements as to fees
pursuant to settlement, however, presuming full compensation, should only be limited by the
relevant rules of professional conduct in the jurisdiction at issue.
308.

Wilkins, supranote 2, at 112.

309. Id. at 135.
310.

Seeidat l13-18.

311. See discussion supra Section f.C.; cf Williams v. Aramark Sports, LLC, No. 10-1044,
2011 WL 4018242, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2011); Trinh v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 07-CV01666 W(WMC), 2009 WL 532556, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3,2009).
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3 12
so should be further scrutinized. _

5. There Must Be No General Releases of Claims
Finally, the fifth prerequisite is that there are no overly broad
waivers of claims (releases) in the FLSA settlement agreement for back
wages. Releases should only waive the right to bring FLSA claims (and,
when appropriate, the state law equivalent wage and hour claims), and
should not be general in nature. Accordingly, for some disputes that
may involve FLSA claims and other causes of action (e.g., breach of
contract or discrimination), it may be necessary for the parties to enter
into two separate settlement agreements--one to dispose of the FLSA
claims and the other to dispose of any other claims. Prohibitions against
general releases is key to ensuring that vulnerable employees are not
compelled to bargain away other rights beyond those subject to FLSA
litigation, in exchange for wages that they are already entitled to under
law. Parties seeking a presumption that a settlement agreement accords
with public policy should be required to show that any release or waiver
of claims is only retroactive (not prospective), and is narrowly tailored to
release only those FLSA claims at issue in the instant action.
In summary, if these five prerequisites are satisfied, then a court
may ipso facto presume that a FLSA settlement agreement does not
violate public policy. Once a settlement is presented to a court that
satisfies these five prerequisites, it should be presumed to accord with
the policies underpinning the FLSA. Once this presumption attaches,
the burden falls on a challenging party to prove that, despite these five
criteria being satisfied, that the agreement, or a provision therein, is
nevertheless void. After the presumption attaches, the burden of
persuasion falls to a contractual party who wishes to challenge the
agreement. In the case of single-plaintiff cases, it is unlikely that a
challenge will arise. However, in the case of collective or class actions,
certain parties may wish to challenge the agreement. These agreements
may be entitled to further supervision pursuant to the class action rules
prevailing in the relevant jurisdiction. This burden-shifting framework
will also ensure that the supervision of FLSA settlement agreements for

312. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a future area of research or initiative would be to
consider the benefits and burdens of the Department of Labor requiring the mandatory filing of all
FLSA settlement agreements for back wages with their office. Then, the DOL could maintain a
repository of all agreements and make them available to the public. This, or a similar mechanism,
without fully exploring the notion, would seem to ensure public access.
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back wages is not subsumed by or ignored in class action cases.313 Once
the five prerequisites are shown, the presumption that the agreement
accords with public policy shall come into effect, and the burden of
persuading the judge that the agreement nevertheless violates public
policy (or is void for another reason) lies with the challenging party. If
no party challenges the agreement, it shall be presumed to accord with
public policy, and be approved by the presiding judge without further
inquiry or analysis. However, all parties shall have a right to attempt to
rebut the presumption.
B. How the PresumptionMay Be Rebutted
Once a party shows that the five prerequisites are satisfied, the
presumption that the settlement agreement accords with public policy
does come into effect, and the burden shifts to the challenging party (if
any) to attempt to rebut the presumption that the contract accords with
public policy, and thus is presumably enforceable.314 A challenging
party may rebut this presumption by showing that some other aspect of
public policy is violated pursuant to the relevant agreement. The
challenging party could argue that a certain provision of the agreement
violates public policy or that the agreement as a whole does, by pointing
to, among other things, the FLSA, its history, related rules or
regulations, or other judicial decisions. 1 5 In the event that a party
successfully shows that a provision of the FLSA settlement agreement
violates public policy, the judge may sever that provision and approve
the rest of the agreement.3 16 Alternatively, if the provision or agreement
as a whole violates public policy, the judge may choose not to approve
it, and force the parties to renegotiate the agreement. This latter scenario
will rarely come into play if the five prerequisites are satisfied, as they
are the material terms of the agreement, and most other terms could
313. See Roberts v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 13-CV-13142-ADB, 2016 WL 8677312, at *5
n.7 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2016) ("A court's review of a FLSA settlement, however, is slightly less
demanding than its review of a Rule 23 class action settlement because, unlike a Rule 23 class
action, a FLSA collective action settlement does not bind absent class members."); see also
Lizondro-Garcia v. Kefi LLC, 300 F.R.D. 169, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
314. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).
315. Id. ("The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or
decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an
expression of public policy. However, not all such sources express a clear mandate of public policy.
For example, a code of ethics designed to serve only the interests of a profession or an
administrative regulation concerned with technical matters probably would not be sufficient.
Absent legislation, the judiciary must define the cause of action in case-by-case determinations.").
316. Id.
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likely be severed without impacting these material terms. Thus, in most
cases, when a challenging party is able to show a provision of a FLSA
settlement agreement violates public policy, after the five prerequisites
are satisfied, the appropriate course of action would typically be for a
judge to sever the provision and enforce the rest of the agreement.3 17
C. If the Five Prerequisitesare Not Satisfied
In the event that the five prerequisites are not satisfied, then a
presumption of enforceability is not created. Nevertheless, a judge may
then scrutinize the entire settlement agreement for public policy
violations, to determine whether or not the agreement may be
approved.3 18 For example, if the second prerequisite is not satisfied, that
is, if an employee is not represented by counsel during settlement, no
presumption will take effect, and the judge will be required to scrutinize
the entire agreement. Depending on the terms of the agreement, the
agreement may still conform to public policy requirements, or it may
not. Similarly, if there is a confidentiality clause of any kind, in
violation of prerequisite four, then the judge would need to scrutinize
that confidentiality clause and the rest of the agreement for potential
public policy violations.3 19 In certain cases, even if the presumption
does not come into effect, a FLSA settlement agreement for back wages
may still be approvable as according with public policy.
In other cases, however, the non-fulfillment of a prerequisite may
require a judge to reject a FLSA settlement agreement for back wages.
For instance, if full compensation is not provided (in violation of
prerequisite one), or if there is a general release of claims (in violation of
prerequisite five), then the settlement agreement violates public
policy. 320 In these cases, additional scrutiny may still be required to
review the agreement for other potential policy violations before
instructing the parties to return to negotiations. In other words, if the
five prerequisites are not satisfied, then additional scrutiny is generally
required, which may lead to approval in some cases, or, in others, the
rejection of the agreement.

317. If a judge desires to scrutinize an agreement further, for example, even if all prerequisites
are met, but there appears to be an attempt at making an end run around the statutory purposes, the
judge may (nay, should) sua sponte analyze the agreement for further potential public policy
violations.
318. See Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982).
319. See discussion supra Sections I.C., V.A.4.
320.

See discussion supra Sections V.A. 1, V.A.5.
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D. Benefits and Burdens of the Rebuttable PresumptionFramework
Through good-hearted attempts to promote the FLSA's policy of
protecting vulnerable employees, courts have simultaneously undercut
the competing FLSA policy of promoting uniformity in the application
of the FLSA. The framework set forth in this article rebalances these
policies by providing an approach that can be applied uniformly across
the circuits, without resorting to increasingly complex and inconsistent
analyses of fairness and reasonableness. This framework returns the
central inquiry of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages to their
common law roots, of considering whether or not the agreements violate
public policy. It modifies the central inquiry from one of fairness and
reasonableness, and instead refocuses the inquiry on its original center,
32
that is, upon whether or not the contract accords with public policy. '
In doing so, this framework increases the potential for parties to contract
freely and autonomously subject to certain prerequisites. By clearly
articulating these prerequisites, moreover, both judges and practitioners
are offered improved guidance in their drafting of and supervising of
FLSA settlement agreements for back wages.
The rebuttable presumption framework reduces the burden on
FLSA practitioners, who will be offered the much-needed guidance as to
what to include in FLSA settlement agreements. So long as practitioners
are fully informed of the five prerequisites, and this approach is applied
consistently across the circuits, there is no non-mischievous reason that
every FLSA settlement agreement should not be approved upon its first
submission. This will reduce the need for courts to scrutinize every
detail of a FLSA settlement agreement, it will reduce the post-settlement
workload of attorneys, and it will expedite settlement terms and
payments to the injured employees who often require swift resolution to
recover much-needed back wages. This framework simultaneously
provides a mechanism for parties to challenge agreements that may
otherwise be against public policy despite satisfying the initial
prerequisites.
By doing so, it balances the needs to protect the
vulnerable employee population with the interests of decreasing the
burden on these parties, and the attorneys who represent them.
The rebuttable presumption framework, however, does have its
limits. The framework's aim is to ensure that FLSA settlement
agreements for back wages do not violate public policy. This framework
does not address the other mechanisms by which a contract could
321.

See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
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otherwise be held void or voidable. Presumably, a party seeking to void
a FLSA settlement agreement on other grounds (such as duress, undue
influence, fraud, or unconscionability) could do so through the normal
procedures of the court regardless of this framework. Alternatively,
evidence supporting any of these common law doctrines could be
presented after the burden shifts to a challenging party to show why the
agreement should not be enforced. Finally, although this framework
provides enhanced guidance to practitioners regarding the content of
FLSA settlement agreements, litigation will inevitably result from
abuses of the prerequisites, and so while this framework has the potential
to reduce the burden on the courts, whether or not it does depends on its
good faith implementation by those who have been enlisted by Congress
to preserve these public rights.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Lynn's Food framework has led to the inconsistent application
of the FLSA, and a circuit court split regarding supervisory requirements
of FLSA settlement agreements involving bona fide disputes for back
wages. This article suggests that a new framework is needed to
rebalance the public policies enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Brooklyn Savings Bank, with the practical necessities .of contemporary
FLSA practice. This article began by tracing the unique historical
factors that led to judicial scrutiny of FLSA settlement agreements for
back wages. It argued that the supervisory requirement is necessary to
ensure the greater public good, and to place a check upon those private
individuals entrusted with ensuring public rights. This article also
revealed the inconsistencies and circuit court split spurring from the
open question left by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding whether private
settlements of bona fide disputes for back wages between an employer
and a FLSA covered employee are enforceable when reached without
court or DOL supervision. It categorized and analyzed the methods by
which the district courts decipher reasonableness and fairness, and how
these varying methods have resulted in inconsistent and inharmonious
applications of the FLSA.32 2 To remedy the lack of unification,
practitioners should ensure that the five prerequisites to the presumption
outlined in this article's burden shifting framework are fully satisfied in
all FLSA settlement agreements, and courts should consider a new
"middle way" approach to judicial supervision of FLSA settlement
322. See discussion supra Section I.B.
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agreements for back wages. Doing so will provide the much needed
movement towards a more uniform, national approach to the supervision
of FLSA settlement agreements for back wages.
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